Whether the defendant’s electric scooter was a “vehicle” under the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC) (MCL 257.1 et seq.); Statutory construction; People v. Zajaczkowski; People v. Cole; McAuley v. General Motors Corp.; MCL 257.625(1); MCL 257.624a; “Motor vehicle” & “vehicle” defined; “Electric personal assistive mobility device” defined; MCL 257.13c; Claim that the scooter is a “low-speed vehicle” subject to different rules of operation; MCL 257.25b; 49 CFR §§ 571.3 & 571.500; People v. Rogers; MCL 257.19a(c)(ii); MCL 257.612; Operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense (OWI)

Holding that the defendant was using the scooter as a vehicle on a public highway and thus, was subject to the rules of the road, the court concluded that the trial court committed clear legal error and abused its discretion in dismissing the charges. The district court bound defendant, who is disabled, over for trial on charges of OWI and possessing an open container of alcohol in a vehicle “for driving his personal electric scooter on a public highway while intoxicated and drinking a can of beer.” He did not challenge that he was intoxicated and in possession of an open container of alcohol. He did not contest that he was travelling “upon the highway.” Rather, he convinced the trial court that his scooter did not qualify as a “vehicle.” The trial court found that the scooter was “an electric personal assistive mobility device” exempt from the definition of “motor vehicle.” MCL 257.13c defines an “electric personal assistive mobility device” as “a self-balancing nontandem 2-wheeled device, designed to transport only 1 person at a time . . . .” As noted by the prosecution, “such devices are generally called ‘Segways.’” The court concluded that the trial court clearly erred in characterizing the scooter under this definition. It is a four-wheel device. This fact also disqualified the scooter from being a “low-speed vehicle.” Further, “even if defendant’s scooter qualified as an electric personal assistive mobility device, low-speed vehicle, or moped, his conduct would not be exempt from prosecution.” The scooter “was a device upon which a person was transported upon a highway.” The court concluded that just as “the MVC applied to the Rogers defendant’s snowmobile when used as a ‘vehicle’ ‘upon a highway,’ the MVC governed the current defendant’s conduct when he used his scooter as a vehicle upon a highway.” Reversed and remanded.