Post-majority child support; Support & Parenting Time Enforcement Act (SPTEA) (MCL 552.601 et seq.) Whether MCL 552.605b(2) authorized the award of child support; Statutory interpretation; Driver v. Naini; Johnson v. Recca; People v. Likine; Lafarge Midwest, Inc. v. Detroit; Michigan’s divorce laws (MCL 552.1 et seq.); MCL 552.16; The Age of Majority Act (MCL 722.51 et seq.); Smith v. Smith; Holmes v. Holmes; MCL 552.16a. Rowley v. Garvin; MCL 552.605b; MCL 552.16(1) & (2)

Holding that Subsection (5) did not apply to the circumstances here, and noting the defendant-father did not challenge the trial court’s determination that the requirements for post-majority child support in Subsection (2) were satisfied, the court affirmed the trial court’s support order. The order required him to pay child support of $580 a month from 8/7/13 to 5/31/14, while the parties’ son, who had attained the age of majority, attended high school. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that MCL 552.605b(2), which is part of the SPTEA, authorized the award of child support. He contended that “Subsection (5) applies to, or otherwise precludes a court from imposing, a child support determination under Subsection (2) unless the parties have an agreement for post-majority child support.” The court rejected this reading of the statute. Subsection (2) “constitutes a continuation of the Legislature’s initial response to our Supreme Court’s decision in” Smith, which held that “a court has no jurisdiction to order post-majority child support absent an agreement by the parties, by establishing a court’s limited authority to order such support. Subsection (5) does not affect the authority granted in Subsection (2), but rather independently sets forth requirements for enforcing agreements for post-majority child support in a judgment or order, regardless of whether the agreement concerns a child who satisfies the requirements for support in Subsection (2).” Viewing Subsection (5) “as a limitation on Subsection (2) would prohibit courts from ordering any support for a child beyond the age of 18 absent the agreement of the parties. Such a reading would render Subsection (2) nugatory.” Further, the two subsections “have distinct and independent purposes. Subsection (2) permits courts, with certain conditions, to order support until a child reaches 19 years and 6 months of age, while Subsection (5) allows for orders extending beyond 19 years and 6 months, covering, for example, agreements to provide for college expenses.” Examining MCL 552.605b as a whole, the court held that defendant’s proposed interpretation would “contravene the Legislature’s clearly expressed intent to authorize courts to order support for a child between 18 and 19-1/2 years of age who is still attending high school as provided in Subsection (2).” Affirmed.