“Other acts” evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. Dobek; Whether the evidence prejudiced the defendant; People v. Lukity; Juror bias; MCR 2.511(D); Poet v. Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp.; Deference to the trial court’s superior ability to assess from a venireman’s demeanor whether the person would be impartial; People v. Williams

[Unpublished opinion.] The court held that the other acts evidence admitted by the trial court did not change the outcome of the case, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s challenge for cause as to a prospective juror. Defendant was convicted of CSC I, first-degree home invasion, and felonious assault for breaking into a home and sexually assaulting a 14-year-old girl at knifepoint. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by admitting exhibits constituting “other acts” evidence, including his Internet search history, e-mails, and photos on his phone. It noted that the majority of the exhibits “would have been admissible had the prosecution provided proper notice,” but even though it did not provide such notice, the error was harmless. “The other evidence in favor of conviction in this case was overwhelming. Both the victim and her aunt positively identified defendant as the attacker in court. Four latent fingerprints matching defendant’s were discovered on the window where the attacker likely gained entry. There was no other plausible explanation regarding how the prints got there. Defendant’s backpack contained a knife and a dark hat with holes in it, both of which the victim identified as similar to the ones her attacker used.” His cell phone “contained an image that the victim identified as a photograph of her lying on a bed. The time stamp on the image matches the approximate time that the crime was committed. From the photograph the victim also identified pillows and blankets that were in the room on the night of the attack.” The court also rejected his claim that he should be granted a new trial because the trial court improperly denied defense counsel’s challenge for cause of one of the prospective jurors during voir dire. “[T]he prospective juror at issue told the court that he might have a hard time being objective because his father had been murdered during a home invasion. However, the prospective juror stated that he believed he was an analytical person who would like to think he could put his emotions aside. The prospective juror’s statement did not rise to the level of a ‘particularly biased opinion.’” Affirmed.