Claim that the trial court’s limitation on the admission of evidence as to the victim’s prior conviction violated the defendant’s right to due process or MRE 404(b); Right to present a defense; People v. Unger; MRE 609; MRE 404(b)(1); Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH)

[Unpublished opinion.] Holding that the trial court did not violate defendant’s right to due process when it prevented defense counsel from questioning the victim about the victim’s prior murder conviction, and that defendant’s appeal was without merit, the court affirmed his conviction of AWIGBH. He claimed that the trial court’s limitation on the admission of evidence about the victim’s prior conviction violated his right to due process or MRE 404(b). However, the trial court properly limited admission of the victim’s criminal history under MRE 609, because “(1) the victim committed the crime in 1992; and (2) he was discharged from parole in 2013.” While defense counsel claimed at trial that “he did not seek to question the victim about the murder conviction for purposes of impeaching the victim, it is obvious from the record and defense counsel’s other statements that counsel sought to do so to: (1) make the victim less trustworthy in the eyes of the jury (in other words, impeach the victim); and (2) establish that the victim had a propensity toward violence.” Neither approach is permitted under MRE 609 or MRE 404(b), which “expressly prohibits the use of ‘other acts’ evidence ‘to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.’” In any event, defendant overlooked the fact that the jury was informed of the prior conviction, because “the trial court ordered the prosecution to stipulate to this fact when defendant took the stand.” In so doing, it permitted him to “explain his state of mind during his brawl with the victim—in other words, present the defense he wanted to present,”—with “reference to the fact that the victim was a convicted murderer.” Further, were the court to find that the trial court abused its discretion in preventing defense counsel from questioning the victim about his prior murder conviction, defendant failed to show that “it is more probable than not” that the victim’s testimony would have convinced the jury that he was not guilty. Even were the court to believe his “version of events—which the jury obviously did not, despite the fact that it knew of the victim’s prior conviction for murder—defendant’s assertion that he acted in self-defense” was not possible as a matter of law.