Limitations on the defense expert’s testimony in the defendant’s trial on CSC charges; MRE 702; Whether the expert’s testimony about forensic interviewing protocols & suggestibility would have been irrelevant & confused the jury; MRE 401-403; The Michigan Child Protection Law (MCL 722.621 et seq.); MCL 722.628(4) & (6); People v. Trakhtenberg; Whether an error affected the outcome of the proceedings; MCL 769.26; People v. Lukity; Challenges to the testimony of the prosecution’s expert; MCR 6.201(A)(3); Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Ackley; Factual predicate requirement; People v. Hoag; Failure to raise a futile objection; People v. Strickland; “Plain error” review; People v. Carines; Failure to obtain a fingerprint report & call a lab analyst as a witness; Claim that the defendant’s due process rights were violated because the verdict form was deficient; Right to a unanimous jury verdict; MCR 6.410(B); People v. Cooks; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Mahone; “Other acts” evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. Jackson

While the court concluded that the trial court erred in limiting the defense expert’s (O) testimony about forensic interviewing protocols and suggestibility, it held that reversal of the defendant’s CSC convictions was not warranted because the error did not affect the outcome. It also concluded that reversal was not warranted on the basis of his claims that counsel was ineffective, that his due process rights were violated by the verdict form, and that the trial court erred in admitting other acts evidence. Thus, it affirmed defendant’s convictions of 16 counts of CSC III. The court concluded that to “the extent that the victim’s interview by the investigating officer conceivably may have tainted her allegations of sexual acts committed by defendant, the admission of expert testimony regarding proper forensic interviewing protocols was relevant, as it would have ‘assist[ed] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine’” a fact in issue. This was also “true in the context of ‘suggestibility’ arising out of the police interview and the interactions and communications between the victim and her mother about defendant, which at times, according to some of the evidence, was sexually graphic.” As to “the trial court’s conclusion that the excluded expert testimony would have confused the jury because the investigating officer was not required to follow any forensic interviewing protocols, MCL 722.628(4) and (6)” established “the error in that proposition.” However, O was “able to give some testimony that supported defendant’s theory of the case,” and that “could reasonably be viewed as undermining the victim’s credibility or the accuracy of her allegations.” O’s actual testimony wandered beyond the trial court’s “restriction at numerous points, touching on some of the very subjects that defendant wished to present to the jury.” Further, “the untainted evidence of an improper relationship between defendant and the victim, evidenced primarily by text messages, was strong and corroborated much of the victim’s testimony.” Defense counsel also “engaged in aggressive cross-examination of the victim in an effort to impeach her credibility, succeeding in part in light of the acquittals on seven counts.”