Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (j) & (k)(iii); Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Simon; Failure to consult with, or seek funds to retain, a medical expert; Principle that only one statutory ground for termination need be proven; In re Ellis; Trial strategy; People v. Payne; Failure to object to inadmissible evidence proffered by the DHHS; Admission of respondent’s psychological evaluation; In re Gilliam; Child’s best interests; In re LaFrance Minors; In re Trejo Minors; Santosky v. Kramer; In re Moss Minors; The preponderance standard

The respondent-mother could not show that she was prejudiced by her trial counsel’s alleged ineffective performance. Since there was clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under § (g), it was immaterial whether inadmissible evidence supported the other statutory grounds cited by the trial court. Further, she could not show any prejudice from her counsel’s apparent failure to consult an independent expert as to a child's injuries. Also, the trial court’s best interest determination was not clearly erroneous. A preponderance of the evidence supported its finding that termination was in JN’s best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to JN. She argued that her counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object to the introduction of respondent’s psychological evaluation at trial, which she contended was inadmissible hearsay. In support, she cited Gilliam, for its holding that, “if termination is sought on the basis of one or more circumstances ‘new or different’ from those that led to the original assumption of jurisdiction, ‘[l]egally admissible evidence must be used to establish the factual basis of parental unfitness sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights.’” She contended that “the psychological evaluation was ‘new or different’ from the circumstances that led the trial court to initially assume jurisdiction.” She was correct. She pleaded no contest to the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction. As the factual basis for the plea, the trial court took judicial notice of the contents of the 2013 supplemental termination petition, which contained “no allegations related to respondent’s mental health or her psychological evaluation. Thus, the psychological evaluation was both new and different from the circumstances that led to the initial assumption of jurisdiction.” However, she did not contest the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence supported the six statutory grounds it cited, including § (g). “By her own testimony and admissions, it was established at trial that respondent failed, throughout the pendency of the child protective proceedings, to document a legal source of income (aside from $194 per month of ‘food assistance and [] Medicaid’) or to obtain suitable housing for her children. The psychological evaluation was unrelated to respondent’s failure—without regard to intent—to provide proper care or custody for JN.”