“Other acts” evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. Katt; People v. VanderVliet; Relevance; People v. Knox; People v. Sabin (After Remand); MRE 403; Effect of the fact this was a bench trial; People v. Lanzo Constr. Co.; Applicability of MRE 404(b)(1) to “the admissibility of evidence of other acts of any person”; People v. Rockwell; The “doctrine of chances”; People v. Mardlin; Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant-Johnson’s arson of an insured dwelling & second-degree arson convictions; MCL 750.76; MCL 750.73; “Willfully and maliciously” defined; People v. Nowack; Identity; People v. Yost; Credibility determinations; People v. McCray; Competency exam; People v. Kammeraad; MCL 330.2020(1); MCL 330.2024; MCL 330.2022(1); MCR 6.125(C)(2) & (4); Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Lopez; People v. Mack; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Vaughn; Principle that defense counsel is not required to make a meritless objection/request/argument; People v. Chelmicki; People v. Ericksen; Court costs; People v. Cunningham; People v. Konopka (On Remand); Waiver of restitution issue; People v. Kowalski; The Crime Victim’s Rights Act; People v. Fawaz; “Victim” defined (MCL 780.766(1)); People v. Allen

The court held that the challenged other acts evidence was properly admitted because the similarities between the prior fires and the fires here showed “a common plan, scheme, or system.” The trial court did not err in considering the doctrine of chances. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant-Johnson’s arson of an insured dwelling and second-degree arson convictions. Further, defendant-Floyd did not show the trial court erred in ruling that the issue of her competency to stand trial was waived, and her ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed. However, the court remanded for a determination of the factual basis for the court costs imposed on Floyd. Floyd was also convicted of arson of an insured dwelling and second-degree arson. Defendants are mother and daughter. Johnson argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about prior fires that led to insurance claims by Johnson and her son. In “the prior uncharged acts, as well as the current situation, an insurance claim was submitted as the result of a fire. In two of the prior incidents, as well as in this case, insurance was procured for personal property in the dwellings approximately one month before a fire occurred. In all three prior instances, as well as in this case, there was a concurrent or immediately preceding theft in addition to the damages asserted from the fires.” None of the homes were occupied when the fires started. “All of the fires were suggestive of arson or of a suspicious origin.” At least two of the properties were owned by Floyd or her sister, “and rented to family members before the fires occurred. Thus, there was evidence of a common scheme or plan to set fires in order to submit claims on insured personal property.” The evidence was “relevant because it was probative of intent, motive, plan, or design.” Further, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence was “highly relevant to the issue whether defendants committed arson” here, and “the danger of unfair prejudice was minimal in light of the fact that there was a bench trial.” Defendants’ convictions and sentences were affirmed.