The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) (MCL 15.361 et seq.); MCL 15.362; Prima facie case; Whitman v. City of Burton; “Adverse employment actions”; Wilcoxon v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.; Peña v. Ingham Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Whether the trial court properly analyzed the case pursuant to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green; Debano-Griffin v. Lake Cnty.; Effect of “direct evidence”; Christopher v. Stouder Mem’l Hosp. (6th Cir.); Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins; Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, MI, Inc. (8th Cir.); Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp.; Circumstantial evidence of improper motives; Shaw v. City of Ecorse; “Mixed-motive” case; Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Veenstra v. Washtenaw Country Club

Concluding that the trial court failed to consider the plaintiff’s direct evidence of a retaliatory motive for her termination, and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the causation element of her WPA claim, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to the defendant-former employer and remanded the case for further proceedings. Plaintiff formerly worked as a home health aide for defendant. She reported directly to the owner, G. The court rejected her claim that the trial court erred in limiting its consideration of G’s alleged adverse employment actions to plaintiff’s termination, concluding that the reduction of her hours was “not a ‘materially adverse’ employment decision, given the particular nature” of her line of work, and that forcing her to wait an extra day to pick up her paycheck constituted “an inconvenience, not a material adverse employment change or an ultimate employment decision.” However, the court found that she presented direct evidence linking her protected activity to G’s “intent to terminate plaintiff.” She claimed that G called her immediately after receiving notice that she had filed a complaint with the State about “her overtime pay, threatening that ‘paybacks are Hell.’” Another former employee’s (B) affidavit corroborated plaintiff’s allegations. B, “who was hired directly following plaintiff’s complaint filed with the State,” stated that G “told her that she would have to ‘work more hours because [plaintiff] was trying to get her into trouble with the State’” and that G “planned on terminating” plaintiff. G was “the primary decision-maker for defendant, and this statement clearly reflects a retaliatory attitude.” While G did not terminate plaintiff until nearly a year after she filed her overtime complaint, that G “may have formed an improper motive almost a year before acting on that motive does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that” B’s assertions were not direct evidence. The fact that G did not terminate plaintiff until 2/14 “and defendant presented proofs in the trial court that plaintiff violated several company policies” in 12/13 and 2/14 meant that this may be a mixed-motive case. Further, “there was a marked difference between the employment-related evaluations from before and after” plaintiff’s report to the State.