Sufficiency of the evidence to support armed robbery & conspiracy to commit armed robbery convictions; People v. Chambers; People v. Cain; Taking money without the owner’s consent; “Owner” defined; People v. Pohl; People v. Hatch; People v. Jones; Conspiracy; People v. Mass; People v. Jackson; Sentencing; Failure to prepare a sentencing information report (SIR); MCL 771.14(1) & (2)(e); MCR 6.425(A)(1) & (D); People v. Johnson; MCL 777.21(1)(b); People v. Lockridge; Sixth Amendment right of confrontation; Coy v. Iowa; Maryland v. Craig; Crawford v. Washington; “Hearsay” (MRE 801(c)); Statement by a co-conspirator (MRE 801(d)(2)); People v. Martin; Prosecutorial error; People v. Bennett; People v. Cross; “Vouching”; People v. Bahoda; People v. Thomas; People v. Goodin; Denigrating defense counsel; People v. McLaughlin; People v. Unger; People v. Matuszak; Cumulative error; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Knapp; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Vaughn; Factual predicate; People v. Hoag; Plea-bargaining process; People v. Douglas; Decision whether to call a witness as a matter of trial strategy; People v. Rockey; People v. Dixon; A “substantial defense”; People v. Chapo; Presumption the jury followed its instructions; People v. Graves

Holding that defendant’s co-conspirator (P) lacked the authority to consent to the taking of the store’s money, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to uphold his armed robbery conviction. Further, the testimony established that they entered into an agreement to take money from the store and for “defendant to use a cell phone as a gun during the robbery.” Thus, the evidence was also sufficient to support his conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction. However, due to the trial court’s error in failing to prepare a SIR, the court vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing. Defendant argued that the prosecution failed to establish the fifth element of larceny – that he took the money without the owner’s consent. The court noted that “although an employee may be considered an ‘owner’ for purposes of the larceny statute so that a taking from them can constitute a larceny, an employee’s status as an ‘owner’ does not render their consent to a taking of property valid consent that transforms that conduct from a larceny into embezzlement.” There was testimony indicating that P “was the only employee in the store at the time of the robbery who had a key to the cash register and the authority to open it.” His “assistant manager status gave him the authority to lock up and run the daily activity of the store. However, after the robbery,” he called a store manager, who instructed him to call 911. The evidence also indicated that P “was not in charge of actually scheduling the employees for shifts at the store. Thus, there was testimony” indicating his “authority at the store was limited.” There was no testimony indicating that he “had dominion over the store’s money such that he had similar power to it as the owner. While the actual owner of the store had conferred limited possession of the store’s money” to P, it did “not appear as if he was empowered with sufficient authority over the money to give valid consent to its taking.” Finding the facts here analogous to those in Jones, the court concluded that “legal possession of the money remained with” the store.