Violation of the Speedy Trial Act (STA or the Act) (18 USC § 3161 et seq.); United States v. Carroll; § 3161(c)(1); United States v. Tinklenberg; United States v. Myers; United States v. Jenkins; United States v. Young; United States v. Crane; United States v. Richmond; Whether conducting voir dire & empaneling a jury (the “start-and-stop” plan) was justified through the Act’s exclusions for witness “unavailability” (§§ 3161(h)(3)(A)-(B) & 3161(h)(7)(C)); “Ends of justice continuance” (§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv)) for counsel unavailability; United States v. Sobh; § 3161(h)(7)(A); United States v. Brooks (3d Cir.); Whether the defendant’s oral objections satisfied the Act’s “motion requirement” (§ 3162(a)(2)); United States v. Alvarez-Perez (9th Cir.); United States v. Arnold (10th Cir.); United States v. Moss; “Waiver” of the right to move to dismiss the indictment; United States v. White; United States v. Sherer; Revocation of supervised release & sentence in a separate matter; Moot ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The district court violated the STA when it began defendant-Brown’s drug-offense trial intending to immediately recess after conducting voir dire and empaneling a jury and reconvene for trial two weeks later. In an issue of first impression, the court also held that his oral objections to the delays satisfied the Act’s “motion requirement.” Citing the two seminal cases, Crane and Richmond, the court rejected “maneuvers aimed at merely paying lip service to" the STA’s requirements and determined that before it could uphold such a “start-and-stop” method of complying with the Act’s 70-day deadline, it was required to “examine whether such a procedure was warranted under the Act.” The court concluded that the district court’s method of resolving the STA problem only “paid lip service” to the Act where it “sought to continue trial to a date beyond the 70-day limit from the outset . . . and only subsequently determined that it would commence trial prior to the expiration of the 70-day deadline” (by conducting voir dire on 9/8 and then taking a 2-week recess until 9/22) after calculating the 70-day deadline. Moreover, both attorneys said that they could be ready for trial on 9/15. The district court erred by citing the Act’s exception for “unavailable” witnesses because the record showed that the government ’s counsel may not have “exercise[d] due diligence” in attempting to procure the witness for the 9/8 trial date, “and the Act explicitly prohibits district courts from granting continuances based on the government attorney’s ‘failure to obtain available witnesses.’” Also, the government had the option of subpoenaing the witness for the 9/8 date. The district court could not justify the delay under an “ends of justice continuance,” and it failed to state the actual reasons for the delay or weigh the interests at stake. The court found that Sherer did “not control and did not preclude Brown from effectively moving to dismiss the indictment based on the STA violation.” Further, Brown’s oral objections to the delays satisfied the Act’s motion requirement (“although defendants should normally make their § 3162(a)(2) motions in writing”). The court vacated his convictions at trial and remanded for a determination as to whether the indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. It affirmed the revocation of his separate supervised release in a matter originally filed in another court, and corresponding sentence.