Sufficiency of the Miranda warning; Miranda v. Arizona; United States v. Al-Cholan; United States v. Wysinger (7th Cir.); Significance of the "in court" language in the Miranda warnings; United States v. Tillman; Florida v. Powell; United States v. Castro-Higuero (8th Cir.); Evans v. Swenson (8th Cir.); United States v. Frankson (4th Cir.); United States v. Hernandez (10th Cir.); Whether the Miranda waiver was "knowing" & "voluntary"; Moran v. Burbine; Ledbetter v. Edwards; Garner v. Mitchell; Sufficiency of the evidence; United States v. Carter; United States v. Copeland; Felon in possession of ammunition; United States v. Kincaide; "Constructive possession"; United States v. Bailey; Conditional grant of a new trial; 18 USC § 3731; United States v. Lawrence; Adequacy of the search warrant; Knott v. Sullivan; United States v. Pelayo-Landero; United States v. Shamaeizadeh; "Probable cause"; United States v. Frazier; Independent corroboration of a confidential informant's tip; United States v. Coffee; United States v. Jackson; Search warrant procedure, Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(f)(1)(C); Frisby v. United States; "Prosecutorial misconduct"; Broom v. Mitchell

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Where the government challenged the district court's order granting defendant-Crumpton's motion for judgment of acquittal and a conditional grant of a new trial, the court held that the district court erred by finding that an inadequate reading of his Miranda rights required the suppression of Crumpton's "Second Statement," which resulted in insufficient evidence to support his conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition. While a search warrant was being executed, an agent (L) read Crumpton his Miranda warnings, during which L said: "Anything you say can be used against you in court. You understand that?" Crumpton replied, "Yes. Um hmmm." L responded "Okay." Crumpton then asked, "Will we be going to court?" L replied "No, I'm just saying, in general. Anything you say can be used against you in court. That's, these are your rights. I'm just, reading, reading them to ya on, off a piece of paper." The district court based its suppression of the Second Statement in part on its concern that this exchange led Crumpton to believe that "he would never go to court in connection with statements he might give to law enforcement, and thereby nullified the Miranda warning that anything Crumpton said could be used against him in court." However, the court cited cases in which "other Circuits have specifically held that a warning that omits the "in court" language does not violate Miranda." It concluded that a "suspect who is informed of his right to remain silent and the fact that filling to do so will result in his statements being used 'against him' is sufficiently informed of the key information the warning seeks to provide." Further, L did not "undermine or contradict the point of the warning by answering '[n]o' when Crumpton asked '[w]ill we be going to court.'" Rather "this answer clarified" that he was not telling him "what would happen next that day, but instead was informing Crumpton of his rights and the consequences of waiving them." The district court also erred by concluding that "Crumpton was coerced into waiving" his rights and that he "did not knowingly waive his rights." The court reversed the grant of Crumpton's motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial on the ammunition charge and reinstated the jury's guilty verdict. It affirmed his narcotics conviction, and remanded for resentencing.