The right to rescind under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA); Whether 15 USC § 1641(g) (enacted in the Helping Families Save their Homes Act) entitled the plaintiffs to rescind their mortgage loan based on the defendant-bank’s failure to notify them of the assignment of the deed of trust; 12 CFR § 1026.39(a)(1); Doctrine of equitable assignment; Carpenter v. Longan; § 1635(a); Material disclosures; § 1602(v); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.; Whether defendant-Wilson & Associates constructively waived its right to remove the case from state court; Regis Assocs. v. Rank Hotels (Mgmt.) Ltd.; Atlanta, Knoxville & N. Ry. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(2); University of TX v. Camenisch; “Rule of unanimity”; 28 USC § 1446(b)(2)(A), (B), & (C); Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.; “Last-served defendant”; Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.; The bank’s standing to enforce the loan; Hearsay; FRE 801(c)(2); Preferred Props., Inc. v. Indian River Estates, Inc.; FRE 902(1)

The court held for the first time that the right of rescission under TILA § 1635 does not apply to violations of § 1641(g) (failure to notify of an assignment). Thus, the plaintiffs-Robertsons were not entitled to rescind their mortgage loan based on defendant-U.S. Bank’s failure to notify them of the assignment of the deed of trust. “The notice requirement applies only to an assignment of the underlying debt, not to the instrument—such as the Robertsons’ deed of trust—that secures the transaction.” Also, even if the bank had violated § 1641(g), they would only be entitled to damages and would not be entitled to rescind their loan. The assignment of the deed of trust did not qualify as “a consumer credit transaction.” Moreover, “only omitted disclosures relevant to the terms of a loan give rise to a right of rescission.” Disclosure of an assignment does not fall under § 1602(v)’s “exhaustive” list of “material disclosures.” Thus, the bank was entitled to summary judgment on this issue. The court also rejected the Robertsons’ claim that defendant-Wilson & Associates, which was responsible for the foreclosure sale, waived its right to remove the case based on its various filings in state court, and that this waiver bound the bank. Wilson did not “explicitly” or “constructively” waive its rights. “Appearing before a tribunal only to excuse oneself from future proceedings does not count as an intentional relinquishment of rights. Nor does filing an answer waive the right to remove . . . .” Even supposing Wilson had waived its right to remove, “the waiver would not bind U.S. Bank. In cases with multiple defendants, the ‘rule of unanimity’ requires that each defendant consent to removal.” The court noted that it has long followed the “last-served defendant” rule, ensuring that “one defendant’s failed attempt to remove could not inhibit a later-served defendant’s opportunity to remove.” Congress has codified this position. U.S. Bank had standing to enforce the note, and the loan documents it introduced were not hearsay under the “verbal acts” doctrine. Affirmed.