Whether the intervening plaintiffs-providers had an independent cause of action for reimbursement for medical & transportation services provided to the plaintiff; Effect of the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; MCL 500.3112; Wyoming Chiropractic Health Clinic, PC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Bahri v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.; TBCI, PC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Dawoud v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Chiropractors Rehab Group, PC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Order dismissing the case under MCR 2.504(B)(1), MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c) & (D)(1)(a) with prejudice as an adjudication on the merits; Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit; Whether plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed; Woods v. SLB Prop. Mgmt., LLC; Trial courts’ inherent authority to sanction litigants & their counsel; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; Dismissal as a drastic sanction; Vicencio v. Jaime Ramirez MD, PC; Requirement that the trial court evaluate all available options on the record; Grimm v. Treasury Dep’t; Consideration of possible lesser sanctions; Grimmer v. Lee; Whether the providers could challenge the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim; Spires v. Bergman; “Aggrieved party”; Department of Consumer & Indus. Servs. v. Shah

The court rejected the intervening plaintiffs-providers’ argument that they had an independent cause of action against defendant-Farm Bureau regardless of the fact plaintiff-Perryman’s claim for PIP benefits was dismissed with prejudice for violating a court order and failing to attend her deposition. However, it concluded that they had standing to challenge Perryman’s dismissal and that the trial court should have at least considered the impact of the dismissal sanction “on all affected parties and whether a lesser sanction would have better served the interests of justice.” Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing all claims and remanded for further proceedings. It first concluded that the dismissal of Perryman’s claim was considered an adjudication on the entire merits of her claim, and as the intervening plaintiffs would stand in her shoes, they would not be entitled to recover PIP benefits for the medical and transportation services they had provided. As in Bahri, “if Perryman, the injured insured, is not entitled to PIP benefits, then intervening plaintiffs, as medical providers, will not be entitled to reimbursement.” However, while the trial court could order the sanction of dismissal for Perryman’s failure to attend her deposition, the court “has upheld the longstanding principle that, when a trial court imposes the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for procedural violations, the trial court is required to carefully evaluate all available options on the record.” Although the trial court briefly explained its decision to dismiss Perryman’s claim, “it did not consider any lesser sanction on the record.” The intervening plaintiffs “presented proof that they were entitled to reimbursement, complied with the trial court’s orders, and in no way delayed or disregarded their obligations to the trial court or defendants. Given that the trial court must evaluate other available options on the record and determine ‘whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice,’ the trial court abused its discretion when it did neither.”