Motion to suppress; Terry stop; Terry v. Ohio; People v. Williams; Whether the officer had an articulable & reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop; People v. Dillon; People v. Christie (On Remand); Credibility; People v. Davis; Whether the officer’s detention of defendant after returning his documentation was reasonably related to the underlying reason for the stop; Rodriquez v. United States; “Seizure”; People v. Jenkins; People v. Shankle; Whether defendant’s consent to search his vehicle was voluntary; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado

The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court properly concluded that Trooper G had articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle, that he was no longer “seized” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment once G returned defendant’s documentation and advised him that he would not be writing a ticket, and that defendant voluntarily consented to answering G’s additional questions and to the vehicle search. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 45 kilograms or more of marijuana. He challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He argued that G did not have an articulable and reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop, i.e., that G’s action in pulling him over was not justified at its inception. The record supported the trial court’s finding that G “had an articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle.” G testified that “he observed defendant’s vehicle cross the fog line and divider lines several times. Video footage from his patrol vehicle supported this testimony.” The trial court found G’s testimony credible, and the court deferred to the trial court’s determination in this regard. Thus, G had articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The fact that defendant found the “reasons” for the stop “trivial” had no impact on the court’s analysis. Also, the trial court properly concluded that defendant was no longer seized after G returned his documentation and advised him that he would not receive a ticket. Further, the trial court properly concluded that his consent to search his vehicle was voluntary. There was no evidence that G coerced or threatened him in any way.