Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; Whether he was entitled to withdraw his pleas because he did not understand what a “consecutive sentence” meant; MCR 6.302(B); People v. Cole; People v. Johnson; People v. Fonville; Factual predicate; People v. Hoag; Whether there was a sufficient factual basis for his pleas; MCR 6.302(D); People v. Eloby (After Remand); People v. Downey; Aiding & abetting three counts of CSC I; MCL 767.39
The court held that because the trial court followed the procedures set forth in MCR 6.302 to ensure a voluntary, understanding, and accurate plea during the plea hearing, it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He pleaded guilty to three counts of CSC I, four counts of armed robbery, and one count of first-degree home invasion. He claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He argued that he was entitled to withdraw his pleas because he did not understand what a “consecutive sentence” meant. “However, the trial court is only required to disclose the direct consequences of a defendant’s plea that automatically affect the range of his sentence.” As consecutive sentencing “was discretionary, i.e., not mandatory,” here, the trial court was not required to inform him of the possibility that the sentences for his convictions would run consecutively. Further, defendant’s argument was not supported by anything in the record. At the plea hearing, the trial court discussed consecutive sentencing with him and both attorneys. It “reiterated the portion of the plea agreement relating to consecutive sentencing, and defendant stated on the record that it was consistent with his understanding of the plea agreement.” Had he “truly not understood the term, this would have provided an opportunity for him to articulate any confusion. But, he did not do so.” Thus, because the record lacked support for his argument, it failed. In addition to advising him of the maximum potential sentence and any minimum sentence requirements, the trial court was also required to “establish support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which defendant is pleading.” He argued that he was entitled to withdraw his pleas because there was an insufficient factual basis for them. The court held that based on the facts elicited from him at the plea hearing, he “could have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting three counts of CSC I.” Affirmed.
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