Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Lockett; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Solloway; People v. Hoag; People v. Payne; Trial strategy; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Matuszak; People v. Dixon; People v. Ackley; Restitution under the Michigan Constitution (Const. 1963, art. 1, § 24) & the Crime Victim’s Rights Act (MCL 780.766); MCL 780.766(2); MCL 780.767(1); People v. Grant; People v. Fawaz; People v. Bell; People v. Lueth; Presumption that the presentence investigation report (PSIR) is accurate

The court held that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court did not err in ordering him to pay restitution. He was convicted of carjacking and unarmed robbery. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth habitual offender to 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the carjacking conviction and 5 to 15 years for the unarmed robbery conviction. It also ordered him to pay $3,055 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress statements. It found he “failed to establish that trial counsel’s representation at the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress statements was objectively unreasonable.” The court noted that trial counsel presented a substantial defense – that defendant’s confession was involuntary “because he was promised that if he signed the papers, he would be able to go home.” Thus, his claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present an expert witness to testify as to his mental health history was meritless. In addition, “[t]he evidence presented by defendant, and his allegation that a hypothetical expert witness would have testified in his favor, does not support the conclusion that trial counsel’s strategy was unreasonable. The fact that trial counsel’s strategy proved unsuccessful does not make it ineffective assistance.” Moreover, he was not prejudiced. The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution because no facts or documentation supporting the amount of restitution was provided at sentencing. “The trial court was entitled to rely on the PSIR in ordering restitution.” It “did not err by relying on the accuracy of the information [as to] damages, and trial counsel raised no objection.” Thus, “as no objection was raised, the trial court was not required to detail its findings regarding restitution on the record.” Further, he “did not contest his ability to pay restitution” and did “not provide any evidence that he would be unable to pay the $3,055.” Affirmed.