Personal jurisdiction; Yoost v. Caspari; Michigan’s long arm statute; MCL 600.715; Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd.; The Due Process Clause; Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc.; Aaronson v. Lindsay & Hauer Int’l, Ltd.; Sifers v. Horen; International Shoe Co. v. Washington; Jeffrey v. Rapid American Corp.; W H Froh, Inc. v. Domanski; Mozdy v. Lopez; “Purposeful availment”; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz; Salom Enters., LLC v. TS Trim Indus., Inc. (ED MI)

Holding that the defendant was entitled to summary disposition due to lack of personal jurisdiction, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s summary disposition motion, and remanded for entry of an order granting the motion. Plaintiff is a Michigan corporation. “Defendant is a Connecticut corporation that has no offices, employees, or agents in Michigan.” While it was “a close question whether the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard of ‘[t]he transaction of any business within the state,’” the court concluded that “defendant’s performance under the contract, and its communication with and submission of payments to plaintiff in Michigan, is sufficient to satisfy MCL 600.715(1).” Thus, it proceeded to the due process step, using the established three-part test. As to the first prong, “defendant did not reach out to Michigan for the possibility of doing business” here. Instead, plaintiff “reached out to Connecticut to take advantage of business opportunities there.” Its representative went to a business conference in Texas and held an iPad raffle “to establish new contacts in other states. Plaintiff’s president went to Connecticut to personally deliver the prize and pitch plaintiff’s services to defendant.” The court found that the case the trial court primarily relied on, Salom, was factually distinguishable as well as non-binding. Next, it held that the second prong, whether the cause of action arose from the defendant’s business activities in the state, was also not met. “Plaintiff’s cause of action arose from defendant’s alleged failure to pay monies owed to plaintiff.” The failure to pay “occurred in Connecticut, where defendant is located and conducts all of its business, rather than Michigan, where plaintiff was awaiting payment.” As to the third factor, none of defendant’s alleged actions were substantially connected with Michigan “so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction there reasonable.” The parties apparently signed the contract in their home states and e-mailed their signatures to each other. It was “silent on choice of law or forum. As the drafter, plaintiff could” have tried to control those choices in the contract, but it did not do so. Nothing indicated “that Michigan is overall a more convenient forum” than Connecticut would be.