Other acts evidence; People v. Gipson; MRE 404(b)(1); Relevance; MRE 401; People v. VanderVliet; People v. Smith; Prejudice; MRE 403; People v. Pickens; People v. Sabin (After Remand); Balancing test; People v. Murphy (On Remand); People v. Wofford; Joinder of cases; People v. Gaines; MCR 6.120; Ineffective assistance of counsel; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Trakhtenberg; Failure to object to the prosecutor’s motion to join the cases; Failure to adequately object (or to file a responsive pleading) to the prosecutor’s notice of intent to use other acts evidence under MRE 404(b); Failure to make a futile objection; People v. Thomas; Failure to investigate certain items; Factual predicate requirement; People v. Hoag; Sentencing; Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing because he was not sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender but the trial court calculated his sentencing guidelines range as enhanced for a fourth-offense habitual offender; MCL 777.21(3)(c)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence, and did not err by ruling that the offenses were related and joinder was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, it affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences in each of the consolidated cases, but remanded for the limited purpose of amending the judgments of sentence to properly reflect his status as a fourth-offense habitual offender. He argued that the trial court erred in joining all three of his cases for trial, and also challenged its determination that evidence relating to each victim was admissible in the cases involving the other victims pursuant to MRE 404(b)(1). Although he asserted in passing the trial court convicted him because of his “propensity to commit the crimes,” the record showed that it “admitted the evidence to show a common scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, which is a proper, non-propensity purpose under MRE 404(b)(1).” Each incident occurred in Detroit, within approximately one month. He “targeted three young, black, female victims. Each victim was walking in public, in the dark. All of the victims were food-service employees, in uniform, on their way to or from work. Defendant approached each victim in a red vehicle and forced them inside by threatening them with what appeared to be a gun.” He took money from two of them. He also forced all of them to “put their heads down in the vehicle, and cover their heads with a hood, hat, or scarf.” He isolated each in “his own territory—either in his car or at his home—while he sexually assaulted them.” All of their clothes were removed. He fondled their breasts, and penetrated each with his finger. Also, he penetrated two with his penis, and washed them afterward. He also tried to bond with them through conversation, and even used information in two of their phones as topics of conversation. He dropped two of them off at home, and even kissed one goodbye and suggested that they see each other again. After his first victim gave him a false name and address, he later confiscated or photographed the other victims’ identifications. “It was not outside the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to conclude that these common features indicated the existence of a common plan.” The fact that it granted his motion for a directed verdict on one charge and acquitted him of several other crimes belied any claim that it convicted him due to the emotional impact of the other acts evidence. Also, as this was a bench trial, the trial court was presumed to consider the other acts evidence only for its proper purpose.