Action alleging injuries caused by a police dog bite; Whether defendants were protected by governmental immunity pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); MCL 691.1407(1); “Governmental agency”; MCL 691.1401(a), (d), & (e); Hannay v. Department of Transp.; Mack v. Detroit; Nawrocki v. Macomb Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Exceptions; Wesche v. Mecosta Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; The dog-bite statute; MCL 287.351(1); Tate v. Grand Rapids; Principle that tort claims for negligence & gross negligence against a governmental agency are barred by the GTLA when the governmental agency & employees were engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function; Ross v. Consumers Power Co.; Hobrla v. Glass; Governmental immunity for individual employees engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function; MCL 691.1407(2); Beals v. Michigan; Tarlea v. Crabtree; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(8); Kendricks v. Rehfield; Radu v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc.; Maiden v. Rozwood; Costa v. Community Emergency Med. Servs., Inc.; Xu v. Gay; Proximate cause; Robinson v. Detroit; Absolute liability; Hill v. Sacka

Holding that the defendants-governmental agencies and employees were protected by governmental immunity, the court reversed the trial court’s decision denying their motion for summary disposition and remanded for entry of summary disposition in their favor as to all of the plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff sued defendants for an injury she sustained when a police dog bit her as officers chased some men during a fireworks show. The trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition. On appeal, the court agreed with defendants’ argument that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary disposition because they were entitled to governmental immunity, noting they were “engaged in the management and control of the police department,” which constituted the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, and plaintiff failed to identify an exception to governmental immunity. On the contrary, defendants “were entitled to summary disposition . . . because all of plaintiff’s proposed claims—i.e., negligence, gross negligence, and her claim under the dog-bite statute—were barred by governmental immunity.” The court also found that because plaintiff’s claims under the dog-bite statute did not involve allegations that the officers acted with gross negligence, the officers were entitled to immunity. Finally, it held that plaintiff failed to present “evidence from which it could be concluded that the officers acted with gross negligence.” It found that, “short of barring all police dogs from public events, it is challenging to discern precisely what plaintiff believes the officers should have done differently that might suggest they were negligent, let alone grossly negligent on the night in question.” In short, “plaintiff’s conclusory assumptions [we]re not evidence that the officers acted with ‘conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’”