Proceeding under the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA) (MCL 722.1431 et seq.); Presumption that a child conceived & born during a marriage is legally presumed the legitimate child of that marriage & the mother’s husband is the child’s father as a matter of law; Pecoraro v. Rostagno-Wallat; Allegation of paternity despite the existence of a presumptive father; MCL 722.1441(3); Judicial determination that a child was born out of wedlock & order of filiation; MCL 722.1443(2)(d) & (e); The alternative one-year limitations period under the RPA; MCL 722.1437(1); “Necessary party” under MCR 2.205(A); The “necessary party” exception; Amer v. Clarence A Durbin Assoc.; O’Keefe v. Clark Equip. Co.; Forest v. Parmalee (On Rehearing); Principle that the relation-back doctrine does not apply to the addition of new parties; Miller v. Chapman Contracting; Principle that a statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it; Casserly v. Wayne Circuit Judge; Cochren v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (4th Cir.); Railey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (GA App.); Beery v. Hurd (IL App.); Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass’n (UT); Neill v. Burke (NE); Dawson v. Callaway (GA); Clark v. Los Angeles (CA App.); Adjudication of rights of non-parties; Yedinak v. Yedinak; Stringer v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of FL (MS App.); Mrozek v. Mrozek (NC App.); Whipple v. Edelstein (NY Sup. Ct.)

Holding that the Court of Appeals erred by prematurely adjudicating the presumptive father’s (a non-party) anticipated defense, the court vacated that portion of its opinion and remanded, but affirmed as to the determination that the presumptive father was a necessary party to the plaintiff’s action seeking to establish his alleged paternity and legal fatherhood of the defendant-mother’s son. Because the child was born during her marriage, her husband was the presumptive father. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that her husband was a necessary party, and because he had not been joined within either the three-year or the alternative one-year limitations period, the action was time-barred. The trial court denied her motion, finding her husband was not a necessary party. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the trial court erred in finding her husband was not a necessary party, the action was not time-barred under “a ‘necessary party’ exception, which allows ‘an additional defendant [to] be brought in after the expiration of the limitations period if the new party is a necessary party.’” In this appeal, the court found that although defendant’s husband was a necessary party, she was not entitled to assert a statute of limitations defense only available to her husband, and the Court of Appeals could not adjudicate his rights when he remained a non-party. Until he “is properly designated as a defendant and exercises his right to raise the statute of limitations in his own defense, the availability of the defense to him cannot be resolved.”