Trip & fall on a city sidewalk; Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); The sidewalk exception; MCL 691.1402a; Robinson v. Lansing; Milot v. Department of Transp.; Whether plaintiff’s statutory notice complied with MCL 691.1404; Plunkett v. Department of Transp.; Requirements for lawful service on a public, municipal, quasi-municipal, or governmental corporation; MCR 2.105(G); McLean v. Dearborn; Whether the defendant-city’s law department was an authorized agent under MCR 2.105(H); Equitable estoppel claim based on defendant’s website & claim form; James v. Alberts; Casey v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Rix v. O’Neil; Justifiable reliance; Adams v. Detroit; Principle that a municipal corporation does not have to plead defective notice as an affirmative defense; Fairley v. Department of Corrs.

Holding that plaintiff’s statutory notice was insufficient as a matter of law where it was served on the defendant-city’s law department, and rejecting her equitable estoppel claim, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying defendant summary disposition, and remanded for entry of summary disposition for defendant. Plaintiff alleged that she tripped and fell on a raised/unleveled portion of a city sidewalk. Through her attorney, she “sent a notice of injury and defect by certified mail to the ‘The City of Detroit c/o The City of Detroit Law Department.’” The return receipt indicated that the notice was received by an individual who was not “the mayor, city clerk, or city attorney.” Plaintiff suggested that “because MCL 691.1404(1) only requires notice on the governmental agency, the Legislature’s use of the permissive ‘may be served’ in MCL 691.1404(2) indicates only that service on a governmental agency might be accomplished by various means, including service on one of the specific individuals authorized to accept service under MCR 2.105(G).” However, this was directly contradicted by the holding in McLean. She also contended that defendant’s Code of Ordinances gave the Law Department written authorization to accept service of process on defendant’s behalf. However, the section on which she relied did not authorize it “to accept service of process on behalf of defendant or any of the individuals listed in MCL 2.105(G)(2).” Regardless, MCL 691.1404(2) “specifically restricts the authority of a municipal corporation to alter the statute’s service requirements,” and the Code did “nothing to relieve potential plaintiffs of their obligation to read and comply with the statutory notice requirements.” She also asserted that “because defendant’s website and claim form direct injured parties to submit notice of claims to the Law Department,” and because a Department employee mailed her “written acknowledgment of her claim, defendant should be estopped from raising the defense of improper statutory notice.” However, it was unreasonable for plaintiff (acting through her attorney) “to rely on defendant’s informal claims materials despite her ability to inform herself of the statutory notice requirement.”