Action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); MCL 691.1407(2); Odom v. Wayne Cnty.; Beals v. Michigan; The gravamen of an action; Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers; Gross negligence claims based on excessive tightness of handcuffs causing physical injury; Oliver v. Smith; Whether defendant’s acts were undertaken in good-faith & without malice; Lattis v. Phillips

The court held that the trial court erred by denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity. Plaintiff was arrested for reckless driving, but the charges were dismissed when it was discovered that defendant stopped the wrong vehicle. Plaintiff subsequently sued defendant alleging gross negligence, assault and battery and false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition without giving any explanation for its reasoning. On appeal, the court first found that because he “based his claims against defendant purely on intentional rather than negligent conduct,” he only asserted claims of intentional tort. Thus, “the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition on [the] gross negligence claim because this count should have been dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” It next found that there was “no genuine issue of material fact that defendant acted under a good-faith belief that he had probable cause to stop and arrest plaintiff, even though he later realized that he had made a mistake.” The court noted that “while plaintiff may dispute the precision of defendant’s various observations, plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence that contradicts the honesty of defendant’s belief that he held at the time of the arrest.” There simply was “no evidence of wanton or malicious conduct or a demonstrated reckless indifference to the common dictates of humanity.” As such, the “intentional tort claims are barred by governmental immunity because the fact that he was mistaken about plaintiff being the driver of the speeding car does not negate defendant’s good-faith belief at the time of the arrest that he had stopped the correct vehicle.” Reversed and remanded.