Claim for uninsured motorist benefits; Whether the policy’s “actual physical contact” requirement was satisfied by the fact that the hit-&-run vehicle hit plaintiff’s vehicle & propelled it into him; Berry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Adams v. Zajac; Lord v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Hill v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am.; McJimpson v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co.; Consulting a dictionary to define terms not defined in the policy; McNeel v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of MI; Actual defined; Insurance contract interpretation; McGrath v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Concluding that the phrase “actual physical contact” as used in the policy at issue was not synonymous with the phrase “direct physical contact” used in the policy in McJimpson, the court agreed with plaintiff-insured that the fact the hit-and-run vehicle hit his vehicle and propelled it into him satisfied the “actual physical contact” requirement in his policy’s definition of “hit and run auto.” Thus, the trial court erred by ruling otherwise as a matter of law. The court reversed the grant of summary disposition to defendant-insurer, and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff sought uninsured motorist benefits under his policy with defendant. The trial court found that McJimpson required dismissal of his claim under the specific policy language. However, the court concluded that the trial court “read McJimpson too broadly.” The result in that case “was based on the language of the insurance policy in that case, which contained the modifier ‘direct’ before the term ‘physical contact.’ Under those circumstances, reading the policy as permitting ‘indirect’ physical contact,” as prior cases had defined it, “would have failed to give effect to that modifier and been contrary to the plain language of the policy.” The court in McJimpson was “clear that its holding was based on the policy at issue.” The policy in this case contained a different modifier before the term “physical contact.” Here, the unidentified vehicle must have “caused plaintiff’s bodily injury by actual physical contact with plaintiff for the coverage to apply.” As the policy did not define actual, the court turned to dictionary definitions and concluded that “the physical contact must not have been merely ‘potential,’ as when a hit-and-run vehicle causes a plaintiff to swerve[.]” The words “actual” and “direct” are not synonymous “and should not be interpreted as essentially identical. At the very least, the policy language is ambiguous regarding whether direct or indirect (but actual and not potential) physical contact satisfies the coverage condition in the policy;” thus, the court construed the policy in favor of coverage.