Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g), (j), & (k)(iii); Principle that at least one statutory ground must be met; In re Moss Minors; In re HRC; Credibility of witnesses; In re Rood; Ineffective assistance of counsel in child protective proceedings; In re CR; In re Simon; People v. Trakhtenberg; Best interests of the child; In re Trejo Minors; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White

The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child where she was not prejudiced by her first counsel’s alleged deficient performance, § (j) supported termination, and it was in the child’s best interests. The DHHS sought termination on the basis of abuse allegations. After closing arguments, the trial court dismissed respondent’s counsel and appointed new counsel, who moved for a new trial. The trial court found that her first counsel’s performance was deficient, but concluded that she was not prejudiced because it had yet to make any findings. It then allowed respondent, represented by new counsel, “‘to reopen proofs in order to further examine witnesses and testify if she chooses.’” On appeal, the court rejected her argument that she should have been granted a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of her first counsel, noting she failed to show how she was prejudiced, and “failed provide any basis” for the court to conclude that “‘but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.’” It also rejected her claim that the trial court erred by finding that the DHHS established a statutory ground for termination, noting that, “based on the extensive history of abuse and respondent’s attempts to minimize her role in—and the severity of—the abuse,” the trial court did not err in finding “by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable likelihood that [the child] would be harmed if returned to” her home. Given that it found at least one ground for termination existed, the court noted it was not required to consider the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision. Finally, it rejected her contention that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in the child’s best interests. “Given all this [] child has endured and, particularly, the significant risk of emotional and physical harm if left in respondent’s care,” the trial court did not err by finding “by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.” Affirmed.