Double jeopardy; People v. Booker (After Remand); People v. Szalma; Whether retrial was barred; People v. Dawson; People v. Lett; Oregon v. Kennedy; The “goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial” standard; United States v. Posner (11th Cir.); Effect of defendant’s agreement to a mistrial; People v. Carter; Sufficiency of the evidence for an aggravated stalking conviction; MCL 750.411i; MCL 750.411i(2)(d); MCL 750.411h(1)(a); Hayford v. Hayford; Stalking defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(e); Harassment defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(c); Unconsented contact defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(e); Emotional distress defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(b); Other acts evidence; People v. Henry; People v. Jackson; People v. Knox; Proper purpose; People v. Johnigan; Relevance; MRE 401; People v. Houston; People v. Mardlin; Logical relevance of similar misconduct; People v. Dobek; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 10; MCL 777.40(1)(a); People v. Cannon; People v. Huston; Proportionality of a departure sentence; People v. Lockridge; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Milbourn; Drawing inferences about a defendant’s behavior from objective evidence; People v. Petri; Consideration of uncharged offenses & pending charges; People v. Coulter (After Remand); The need to protect others; People v. Armstrong; Reasons given for the extent of the departure; People v. Smith

Concluding that defendant’s agreement to a retrial waived his double jeopardy claims, the court held that there was no merit to his contention that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy barred his retrial. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support his aggravated stalking conviction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence. Finally, the trial court did not err in scoring OV 10 at 15 points, and the upward departure sentence it imposed was proportionate. He was sentenced as a fourth offense habitual offender to 20 to 30 years. Even if he had not affirmatively waived the double jeopardy issue, appellate relief would not be warranted because the prosecution’s “conduct was negligent, but not intentional.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence, his “unconsented contacts with the victim at her workplace and by means of placing a note on her car fall within the categories of unconsented contacts specifically identified by the Legislature.” Her testimony also supported a conclusion “that there were two or more acts of unconsented contact that caused her to suffer emotional distress.” The fact he did not threaten her was “not dispositive of whether she suffered emotional distress.” She testified to feeling “terrified and frightened” by his contacts. Under the totality of the circumstances, the “contacts would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.” Next, given “the multiple similarities between” his prior conduct and the charged crime, the other acts “evidence was logically relevant to show that defendant operated under a common plan, scheme, or system.” In upholding the score for OV 10, the court concluded that his conduct was predatory in nature and “directed toward a specific victim, who was made vulnerable by defendant’s attempts to isolate her.” The trial court identified several reasons for its departure sentence that the guidelines did not adequately consider, including his long history of misconduct, failure to rehabilitate, and the need to adequately protect society. Further, its reasons for the extent of the departure were clear and the sentence “satisfied the principle of proportionality.” Affirmed.