Unfair labor practice (ULP) charges; The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) (MCL 423.201 et seq.); Alleged coercion to pay union membership dues or nonmember service fees; MCL 423.209; MCL 423.210(2)(a); MCL 423.210(3) & (5); Taylor Sch. Dist. v. Rhatigan; Stare decisis; W A Foote Mem’l Hosp. v. Jackson; Civil fines under MCL 423.209(3); Michigan Employment Relations Commission’s (MERC) jurisdiction; Bank v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n; MERC’s powers; Saginaw Educ. Ass’n v. Eady-Miskiewicz; MCL 423.216(b); Review of MERC decisions; Calhoun Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Calhoun Intermediate Educ. Ass’n; Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28; MCL 423.216(e); Administrative law judge (ALJ)

Concluding that the case was not factually distinguishable from Taylor and that the MERC did not commit a substantial and material error of law, the court affirmed the final decision and order affirming the ALJ’s findings that respondent-union committed a ULP by violating MCL 423.210(2)(a), and entering a cease and desist order against respondent. The court rejected the charging parties-teachers’ argument on cross-appeal that the MERC erred by failing to assess civil fines pursuant to MCL 423.209(3), holding that the fines were not available because the MERC properly ruled that respondent did not violate MCL 423.209(2). The court noted that it had to follow the Taylor decision as it was binding case precedent, and it found that decision was directly applicable here. The MERC determined in both cases that ULPs in violation of MCL 423.210 occurred. The memorandum of agreement (MOA) here extended for 3 years, while the agreement in Taylor expired after 10 years. The MOA in this case established a 3% wage reduction, while “the charging parties in Taylor faced a 10% wage reduction and suspension of pay increases. Finally, in this case, MERC did not determine whether respondent breached its duty of fair representation,” while the court in Taylor held that MERC did not err by finding that the respondent-union violated its duty of fair representation and committed a ULP. “These factual differences were not relevant to the determination whether respondent’s enforcement of” the 2013 MOA after the effective date of 2012 PA 349 constituted a ULP. The court also rejected the contentions that (1) the MERC erred in concluding that the 2013 MOA “did not require charging parties to financially support the labor organization as a condition of” continued employment and (2) “the agency shop provision was valid and enforceable because it was executed before the effective date of 2012 PA 349 and was not subsequently extended or renewed.” As the MERC correctly found that respondent did not violate MCL 423.210(3), MCL 423.210(5) did not apply and render the MOA lawful.