Whether there was a Cobbs plea agreement; MCR 6.310(B) & (D); People v. Cobbs; People v. Killebrew; People v. White; People v. Martinez; Plea agreement; MCR 6.302(C); Principle that statutes are presumed constitutional; People v. Parker; Court rule interpretation; People v. Buie; Vagueness; People v. Herron; Lanzetta v. New Jersey
The court held that there was no Cobbs agreement and thus, the trial court did not violate any of defendant’s rights under Cobbs. He pled guilty to accosting a minor for immoral purposes, as a second-offense habitual offender, as well as two counts of CSC I, also as a second offender. The parties agreed to a minimum sentence of 22 years. When it was found that defendant attempted to send letters to one of the victims, the trial court sentenced him to a longer sentence. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court did not comply with the Cobbs agreement, finding “there was no Cobbs agreement.” Given that he did not have a Cobbs agreement, “the trial court did not violate any of [his] rights under Cobbs.” Further, the added handwritten language in his plea agreement “was irrelevant to the trial court’s consideration, and therefore, it did not violate any of defendant’s rights.” It also rejected his claim that the conditions of his plea agreement were not plainly stated or made clear at the time of the plea hearing or acknowledged by him or his counsel. Because “the written terms of the plea agreement were incorporated into the record . . . defendant had sufficient notice of the terms.” Further, he “was made aware of the conditions of his plea agreement, including the condition that he would lose his right to withdraw his pleas if he engaged in misconduct between entering into the plea agreement and sentencing.” Finally, although the plea agreement did “not list examples of what may constitute misconduct, and the trial court did not place any such examples on the record for defendant, a man of common intelligence could deduce that violating a court order and attempting to break the law would constitute misconduct.” Thus, as applied to him, “the language of MCR 6.310(B)(3) is not so vague that it requires guessing nor has its application resulted in varied outcomes.” It followed that the court rule is not void for vagueness. Affirmed.
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