Allegations of veterinary negligence under MCL 333.16221(a) & incompetence under MCL 333.16221(b)(i); Sillvery v. Board of Med.; Collateral estoppel; People v. Gates; Arim v. General Motors Corp.; Young v. Edwards; The law of the case doctrine; Bruce Twp. v. Gout; Ashker ex rel Estate of Ashker v. Ford Motor Co.; Revisions & modifications of an order; MI Admin Code, R 338.1630(4) & (5); Interpretation of administrative rules; Detroit Base Coal. for the Human Rights of the Handicapped v. Department of Soc. Servs.; Whether petitioner’s determination was supported by competent, material, & substantial evidence; Department of Cmty. Health v. Risch; Claim that petitioner did not give proper deference to the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) opportunity to hear the testimony & view the witnesses firsthand; Michigan Employment Relations Comm’n v. Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc.

The court held that petitioner-Board of Veterinary Medicine’s Disciplinary Subcommittee did not err by imposing professional probation with conditions on respondent-veterinarian based on negligence and failure to exercise due care. A viewer of respondent’s television program took issue with the manner in which he performed a procedure on a dog and filed an administrative complaint with petitioner. A horse’s owners also filed a complaint related to the treatment of their horse. The ALJ found “petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent was negligent or incompetent in his care of the dog or the horse” and that he should not be subject to sanctions. Petitioner adopted in part and rejected in part the ALJ’s findings, determining there was adequate evidence that respondent violated MCL 333.16221(a) based on his “failure to intubate the dog during the procedure, failure to wear a surgical mask and gown during the procedure, and failure to clip the hair around the horse’s wound prior to suturing the wound[.]” It placed him on probation for “a minimum of one day, not to exceed one year” and directed him to pay all costs incurred in complying with the terms of its order and to comply with the Public Health Code. The court rejected his argument that petitioner erred by declining to give preclusive effect to the court’s conclusion in his previous case, noting that “what, if any, standard of care applies in relation to veterinary surgical attire is a question of law and” the two cases concerned different animals and surgical procedures. It also found that the law of the case doctrine barred it from considering his claim that petitioner denied him his right to constitutional due process by refusing to supplement the official record with transcripts of two meetings it held when deciding his case, noting its decision in a prior order “now stands as the law of the case[.]” It next rejected his contention that petitioner’s final order was deficient because it did not satisfy the requirements of MI Admin Code, R 338.1630(4) and (5), finding petitioner adequately specified its departures from the ALJ’s conclusions. The court further rejected his argument that petitioner’s final order was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, finding “expert testimony presented at the hearing was sufficient to establish that there was an applicable standard of care that respondent breached.” Affirmed.