The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) (MCL 15.361 et seq.); Chandler v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc.; Res judicata; Vandenberg v. Vandenberg; Mable Cleary Trust v. Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust; Discharge in violation of public policy claim; McNeil-Marks v. Midmichigan Med. Ctr.-Gratiot; Anzaldua v. Neogen Corp.; Landin v. Healthsource Saginaw, Inc.

The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s WPA claim in the amended complaint because res judicata did not apply. However, it affirmed the earlier summary disposition of her original WPA claim due to the absence of WPA-protected activity in the original complaint. It also affirmed dismissal of the violation of public policy claim raised in the amended complaint, which did not identify any objective source for the claim. Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant-Grand Traverse County, initially filed a three count complaint, alleging she was wrongfully discharged in violation of the WPA. “However, because she alleged that she was terminated for whistleblowing activities concerning the County’s planned violations of law,” the trial court granted summary disposition on the original WPA claim in 2/18. Plaintiff then filed her amended complaint, alleging that she was “terminated for having reported or for being about to report several ‘violations’ or suspected violations of law.” She further asserted “that the County’s stated reasons for firing her were pretextual, and that public policy prohibited the County from firing her based on her report of planned violations of law.” In 7/18, the trial court again granted the County summary disposition, ruling that the WPA claim was barred by res judicata and that the public policy claim was unsupported by the law. The court first held that the trial court erred in dismissing the WPA claim because plaintiff’s first amended complaint did not constitute a subsequent lawsuit for res judicata purposes. As to her original WPA claim, while plaintiff contended that the trial court erred by concluding that she was unable to prove the causation element, it did not analyze this element. Rather, it “expressly held that ‘without a protected activity, there is no claim under the WPA and analyzing whether there was a causal connection is not required.’” Given that it was “undisputed that no activity protected by the WPA was alleged in the original complaint,” there was no reversible error as to the 2/18 order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.