Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree child abuse; MCL 750.136b(2); People v. Gould; People v. Maynor; Intent; People v. Anderson; People v. Mills; Inferences; People v. Henry; Mistrial; People v. Haywood; People v. Horn; People v. Long; People v. Page; Curative instruction; People v. Callon; People v. Petri; Prosecutorial error; People v. Lane; People v. Bennett; People v. Unger; People v. Bahoda; People v. Phillips; People v. Dobek; People v. Dalessandro; People v. Watson; People v. Blevins
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s first-degree child abuse conviction, that the trial court did not err by denying her motion for a mistrial, and that the prosecution did not commit misconduct. She was convicted due to unexplained injuries suffered by her 10-month-old daughter. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction. “[T]he evidence that defendant was [the child’s] exclusive caretaker during the time in which [she] would have sustained her injuries, that defendant’s housemate heard a ‘thud’ and then noticed a look of alarm on defendant, that defendant failed to obtain timely medical attention for [the child], that defendant offered various unconvincing and inconsistent explanations for [her] injuries, and that defendant was dishonest with the police about the location of her and [the child’s] place of residence, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant was responsible for” the child’s injuries. Further, the “medical testimony, considered along with the indications that defendant failed to seek immediate medical care in spite of [the child’s] clear and obvious injuries, was sufficient to persuade a reasonable juror that defendant either intended to seriously harm [her] or at least knew that serious harm would result from her actions.” The court also rejected her claim that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor asked her on cross-examination about contacting sequestered witnesses. It noted that “no evidence ever reached the jury regarding defendant’s text message to her friend, and because defendant never answered the prosecutor’s question about contacts with sequestered witnesses, there was no actual evidence of witness tampering for the jury to consider.” Further, the jury was instructed “that the lawyers’ statements, arguments, and questions were not evidence.” Finally, the court rejected her contention that the prosecutor improperly denigrated the defense through its expert’s testimony, “improperly suggested that defense counsel mischaracterized the law,” and misrepresented the facts in evidence, finding each claim meritless. Affirmed.
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