Prearrest delay; People v. Adams; People v. Mahone; People v. Al-Shara; People v. Cain; Due process; People v. Patton; People v. Scott; Actual & substantial prejudice; People v. Woolfolk; Right result reached for the wrong reason; People v. Ramsdell

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because he failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the prearrest delay. On appeal, the prosecution argued that defendant failed to meet his burden by showing that actual and substantial prejudice resulted from the delay. “At the motion hearing, the trial judge reasoned that when the prosecution ‘receive[s] the information about the charges and they intend to charge him, they have to charge him within a reasonable amount time.’” Thus, the trial judge determined that defendant’s right to due process was “violated because the delay was unreasonable. But a delay alone does not establish prejudice because a defendant has no right to be arrested. . . . Rather, the proper test is whether a defendant has established actual and substantial prejudice to his defense.” The trial judge did not make any such finding. As a result, the order to dismiss was based on an error of law and, thus, was an abuse of discretion. But the court will “not reverse where the trial court reaches the right result for a wrong reason.” Thus, it addressed defendant’s remaining arguments that would support dismissal. He argued that the prearrest delay resulted in actual and substantial prejudice because he may face adverse sentencing consequences. Such “consequences could arise because if the prosecution had brought the charges relating to the [3/19/17] offenses at the same time that it charged the [12/30/17] offense, defendant could have received concurrent sentences.” This argument lacked merit. “At the motion hearing, the trial judge found that ‘it is unreasonable to expect [defendant] to be charged after a conviction, a second offense occurring much later than the first offense . . . [a]nd then . . . fac[e] a subsequent sentence. . . .’” Thus, the trial judge held that defendant’s right to due process was violated because he was facing an additional sentence for the 3/19/17 offenses. However, the trial judge made an error of law by doing so. The “question before the trial court was whether defendant’s ability to defend against the charges had been meaningfully impaired by the prearrest delay, not whether defendant might have received a better ‘package’ deal or served concurrent sentences,” if the 3/19/17 and the 12/30/17 offenses had been tried or sentenced at the same time. Thus, the trial judge abused his discretion by finding that defendant’s right to due process was violated because he potentially faced an adverse sentencing consequence. Vacated and remanded.