Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (j), & (k)(i); In re White; In re Ellis; In re VanDalen; In re Laster; In re Williams; In re Smith; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Moss Minors; In re Schadler; In re TK; In re Contempt of Henry

Holding that §§ (a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (j), and (k)(i) existed and the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, the court affirmed. There was clear and convincing evidence placed on the record that the mother abandoned the young children for a period in excess of 91 days. As a result, the trial court did not err in terminating her parental rights under §§ (a)(ii) and (k)(i). Also, the evidence showed not only that she “had failed to rectify the conditions that brought the children into care but also, through her failure to participate in or benefit from services, that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify the conditions in a reasonable time.” Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating her parental rights under § (c)(i). Further, the evidence “demonstrated other conditions that could lead the children to come under the court’s jurisdiction and a failure on the part of respondent to rectify these issues. As a result, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating” the mother’s parental rights under § (c)(ii). Finally, she “failed to engage in the majority of the services mandated in her treatment plan. As a result, the trial court could reasonably find that respondent was unable to provide proper care and custody for the children, there was a reasonable expectation of future harm to the children if returned to respondent’s care, and there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide proper care in the future.” Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating her parental rights under §§ (g) and (j).