Custody; The Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.); MCL 722.28; Fletcher v. Fletcher; Modification of custody & parenting time; Proper cause or a change of circumstances (COC); Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Principle that stipulations are favored & generally upheld; Napora v. Napora; Findings on the statutory best interest factors (MCL 722.23); Berger v. Berger; Factors (d), (g), (h), & (j); Clear & convincing evidence; In re Martin; Assumption the trial court knows the law & only considered the evidence properly before it; In re Archer; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Inapplicability of the Confrontation Clause to civil proceedings; Galien Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ.

Holding that the trial court did not err in accepting the stipulation in the parties’ divorce judgment as to what evidence would show proper cause or a COC, and that its findings on the best interest factors were not against the great weight of the evidence, the court affirmed the order awarding the parties joint physical custody of their child and modifying parenting time. The parties agreed in the judgment that if either of them “relocated closer to the other, such a move would be considered sufficient proper cause or a [COC] for a” petition for review of the custody and parenting time order. The gravamen of plaintiff’s argument was that the trial court still had “to make additional, independent findings” as to whether defendant-father established proper cause or a COC by a preponderance of the evidence. But she did not provide any argument or authority for the position that their agreement was insufficient to meet his burden. In challenging the trial court’s findings on the best interest factors, she asserted as to (d) that it did not consider that the child primarily lived with her and improperly found that her “reason for moving was self-serving. However, the record shows that the trial court clearly considered that the child had lived with plaintiff since birth. To the extent” her arguments were based on its credibility determination, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility assessment. She did not show that the evidence clearly preponderated against its findings on (d). As to (g), the record showed that while “the trial court noted that plaintiff’s testimony appeared to substantiate certain of the findings in her psychological evaluation,” its conclusions were based on facts and testimony presented in the evidentiary hearing. Thus, the record did not support her claim that it “relied heavily on her psychological evaluation when assessing factor (g).” Further, the court could not say that the trial court’s judgment that (h) slightly favored defendant, and that (j), which it heavily weighed, also favored him was against the great weight of the evidence. The weight to give each factor was within its discretion. Lastly, even if it erred in admitting “two hearsay statements from plaintiff’s psychological evaluation,” there was no evidence she was prejudiced, and there was no “constitutional violation because the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply to civil proceedings such as” this.