Motion for change of venue in a wrongful death action; MCL 600.1629; Karpinsky v. Saint John Hosp-Macomb Ctr. Corp.; MCL 600.1629(1)(a)-(c); Massey v. Mandell; “Resides”; “Domicile”; “Residence”; Grange Ins. Co. of MI v. Lawrence; Curry v. Jackson Circuit Court; Coleman v. Gurwin; Schultz v. Silver Lake Transp., Inc.; Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp. v. Pantig

Holding that the trial court clearly erred by denying defendant’s motion to change venue because venue was proper in Gladwin County and improper in Genesee County under MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i), the court reversed and remanded. Plaintiff filed this wrongful-death case against defendant, the decedent’s husband. The complaint alleged that the motor vehicle accident occurred in Gladwin County. “Plaintiff relied on MCL 600.1629(1)(c) to justify the choice of venue in Genesee County.” Neither party argued that MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(ii) or (1)(b) applied. Thus, the court only examined MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i) to determine whether, as defendant argued, this provision indicated that Gladwin County was the proper venue and that Genesee County was an improper venue. “Relevant to the appeal, venue is proper under MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i) in the county where the original injury occurred if ‘[t]he defendant resides . . . in that county’ as well.” The dispute here centered “on whether defendant ‘resides’ in Gladwin County and the meaning of that term in the statute. The statute does not define the term ‘resides.’” The parties did not dispute that defendant owned homes in both counties. Plaintiff only submitted “evidence purporting to show that defendant’s primary residence, was in Genesee County. Moreover, plaintiff explicitly conceded that defendant owned the homes in each county.” In the trial court, the parties essentially argued about which one of his two homes was the pertinent one to consider for purposes of determining venue. The court concluded that they “misconstrued the meaning of the term ‘resides’ in MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i), treating this term as if it were synonymous with the concept of domicile.” Also, the trial court “erred by basing its ruling on the same misconception . . . .” Nothing in the language of MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i) states “that the defendant is limited to a single residence, or that defendant’s ‘primary’ or ‘principal’ residence is relevant, for purposes of determining venue.” The court noted that when the issue is “whether the defendant ‘conducts business’ in the county, which is an alternative means of satisfying MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i) other than showing residence, we have acknowledged that an entity may conduct business in multiple counties.” Here, the “evidence that defendant owns a home in Gladwin County and stays there—even if it is a second home and not his domicile—demonstrates sufficient contact with Gladwin County to show that he ‘resides’ in Gladwin County for purposes of determining venue under MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i).”