Legal malpractice; Estate of Mitchell v. Dougherty; Negligence; Simko v. Blake; Collateral estoppel; Keywell & Rosenfeld v. Bithell; Proximate causation; Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko; Kloian v. Schwartz; Conclusory allegations; State ex rel Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp.; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10); Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co.; Due process; Cummings v. Wayne Cnty.; Vicencio v. Ramirez; Notice of a summary disposition hearing; Effect of having actual notice; MCR 2.613(A); Judicial bias claim; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a); In re Susser Estate; In re Contempt of Henry; Effect of involvement in a prior trial or other proceeding; People v. Upshaw; FMB-First Nat’l Bank v. Bailey

Holding that, as a matter of law, most of plaintiff’s allegations failed to state a claim for legal malpractice, and that he did not offer any evidence supporting his allegations of collusion, deliberate deception, and fraud, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-attorney. Further, he was not entitled to any relief on his claim he was denied due process because he did not receive notice of a summary disposition hearing given that he had actual notice and appeared at the hearing. Finally, the court rejected his judicial bias claim, which was based only on the facts that the judge in this case also presided over the underlying property case and ruled against him in that suit. Plaintiff contended that defendant should have done more in responding to the summary disposition motion brought by defendants (the As) in the property case. But the court found that defendant’s decisions in responding to the As’ summary disposition motion, “including what arguments to make and what evidence to present, were tactical.” There was no indication he made those “tactical decisions with less than the knowledge, skill, and ability of an average attorney.” The fact that he was unsuccessful in defeating the motion did not give rise to a malpractice claim as he “did not have a duty to ensure a favorable outcome.” Plaintiff also challenged his handling of procedural matters. But these allegations also did not support a malpractice claim. They were “conclusory in nature, failing to set forth the basis on which [defendant] could have, or should have, objected to the reassignment, the scheduling order, or the denial of a stay. Further,” in an appeal in the property case the court had found that the trial court judge “had the authority to modify the scheduling order, that he did not abuse his discretion by removing the matter from case evaluation, and that [plaintiff] had no right to be heard at the status conference.” He was precluded from relitigating these issues by collateral estoppel. As to his contention that defendant did not “keep him adequately informed of proceedings in the property litigation, such as the status conference, or” otherwise acted unreasonably as to the procedural issues he raised on appeal, he could not establish proximate cause. He offered nothing indicating that these matters affected the outcome of the property case, in which construction liens were found dispositive.