Exclusion of evidence; Expert testimony; MRE 702; People v. Beckley; Exclusion under MRE 403; Commenting or opining on another person’s credibility; People v. Musser; Principle that the prosecution’s questions are not evidence; People v. Mesik (On Reconsideration); Relevance; MRE 401; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Petri; Denial of motion for a mistrial; People v. Dickinson; Unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question; People v. Haywood; Cumulative error; People v. Dobek; Sentencing; Effect of a within guidelines sentence; MCL 769.34(10); People v. Schrauben; Constitutional claims; People v. Conley; Eighth Amendment right to receive medical treatment; People v. Shafier; Johnson v. Wayne Cnty.; Abandoning an argument by failing to support it; People v. Kelly; People v. Solloway

The court held that the trial court did not err in excluding defendant’s proffered expert testimony about the victim’s (A) reactive attachment disorder (RAD) diagnosis and post-traumatic experiences because the jury could have viewed the testimony as opining that A “was predisposed to lie and was not credible.” It also did not err in excluding other proffered testimony, or in denying his motion for a mistrial based on statements that were isolated, voluntary, and unresponsive to proper questions by the prosecutor. His cumulative error claim failed in light of the absence of any errors, and the court rejected his sentencing arguments. Defendant was convicted of CSC II; accosting, enticing, or soliciting a child for immoral purposes; and indecent exposure. The trial court concluded that the prejudicial nature of the expert’s (Dr. P) testimony would mislead the jury to believe that A “could not be believed. According to Dr. [P’s] letter, he was prepared to testify that the symptoms of a RAD diagnosis included ‘a propensity to lie, reduced conscious, and variable attachments to others.’” The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Further, to the extent P’s “testimony would not have commented on” A’s credibility, it would not have assisted “the jury in understanding evidence or determining an issue of fact,” but there was a substantial risk of prejudice. As to his motion for a mistrial, the trial court granted defendant’s objection as to witness-H’s testimony that she believed A, “struck the statement from the record, and instructed the jury to disregard” H’s testimony as to A’s credibility. Given that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, any prejudice from H’s first challenged statement was probably cured by the trial court’s instruction. Further, defendant could have accepted the trial court’s offer to give an additional instruction after H made a second statement, “but did not. Any prejudice arising from the lack of an additional instruction” as to that statement was not attributable to the trial court. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s claims that his within guidelines CSC II sentences were disproportionate and that his sentences violated his constitutional right to receive medical treatment. Affirmed.