Whether the phrase “services rendered in the city” in MCL 141.623 of the Uniform City Income Tax Ordinance (UCITO) (MCL 141.601 et seq.) encompasses legal services performed within the city but delivered to clients situated outside it; Taxation of a business’s “net profit” for business activities that are not “exclusively” conducted within the city; MCL 141.618; The “business allocation percentage method”; MCL 141.620-24; Apportionment of receipts from the sale of services; MCL 205.553(b)(1)(C)(2) & (3); MCL 205.553(c)(3)(b); MCL 206.123; MCL 206.665(2)(a); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Department of Treasury; “Rendered”; Defining terms undefined by statute; Oakland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs Rd. Comm’rs v. Michigan Prop. & Cas. Guar. Ass’n; “Services rendered”; MCL 141.612(b); MCL 141.613(b); MCL 141.614; Statutory interpretation; G C Timmis & Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co.; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing); Bauserman v. Unemployment Ins. Agency; Tax Tribunal (TT)

Holding that § 23 of the UCITO “encompasses all legal services performed, i.e., done or carried out within the city without regard to where” they are delivered, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the TT for entry of an order granting partial summary disposition for respondent-city. In determining petitioner-law firm’s tax liability, respondent calculated its revenue factor for services performed within the city (including those on behalf of out-of-city clients) as approximately 50% of petitioner’s gross revenue. The TT agreed with respondent’s position, concluding that, under § 23 of the UCITO, "services rendered in the city” encompasses all legal services performed within the city regardless of where those services are delivered. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the pertinent consideration under § 23 is where the services are delivered to the client. In the present appeal, the court agreed with the TT that, “‘rendered’ means, as set forth by [respondent], ‘to do (a service) for another,' and not, as set forth by [petitioner], ‘to transmit to another: DELIVER.’” Thus, it found that “the Legislature adopted an ‘origin test,’ rather than a destination or market-based test, for the calculation of revenue from ‘services’ under the revenue factor. Section 23 encompasses all legal services performed, i.e., done or carried out, within the city without regard to where those services are delivered.” In so holding, the court acknowledged that “the terms ‘performed’ and ‘rendered’ generally have similar meanings and are effectively equivalent in their relative purposes within the statute. However, the distinctive contexts in which these terms appear accounts for the use of different words despite their similar meanings.” It concluded that respondent’s interpretation, rather than petitioner’s, set forth “the most reasonable understanding of the revenue factor” and the one that is “most harmonious with the statutory framework as a whole.” Accordingly, it concluded that “the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the determinative consideration under § 23 is where, in the end, the services are delivered to the client.” 

Justice Viviano, joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justice Clement, concurred in the majority’s holding that “MCL 141.623 encompasses all legal services done or carried out in” the city, and “with much of the analysis leading to that holding, in particular the historical discussion and comparative analysis of the [UCITO] and Michigan’s analogous state-taxation statutes.” However, they parted ways with the majority over Part III(D) of the opinion, “which confusingly endeavors to create ever-so-slight daylight between the terms ‘render’ and ‘perform,’ characterizing them as ‘similar’ but not the same.”