Action to stop a foreclosure & to discharge a mortgage; Motion to vacate a consent judgment; A settlement agreement as a contract; Kloian v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC; In re Robert H. Draves Trust; Finality of settlement agreements; Clark v. Al-Amin; Requirements of MCR 2.507(G); Effect of a settlement agreement in open court; Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Sfat; Wagner v. Myers; Appeal from a consent judgment; Dora v. Lesinski; Sauer v. Rhoades; Due process; MCR 2.401; Claim that the consent judgment should be set aside because the parties were not under oath when they entered into the agreement; Marsh v. Department of Civil Serv.; Indefiniteness; Calhoun Cnty. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI; Effect of stipulating to a matter in the trial court; Holmes v. Holmes

The court held that because “the parties agreed on the record to settle the litigation rather than having the issues of the litigation determined by the trial court, plaintiff was not entitled to set aside the consent judgment and have the issues determined by the trial court,” or to have those issues determined by the court. It also rejected his claim that the trial court improperly insisted that he participate in a surprise settlement conference. Thus, the court affirmed the consent judgment ordering plaintiff-borrower to pay defendant-trust $5,000 in exchange for defendant’s discharge of a mortgage, but remanded for correction of a clerical error in the consent judgment. Plaintiff contended that the trial court erred by denying his motions to vacate the consent judgment. He argued that “he was entitled to entry of a default judgment against defendant and also that defendant was precluded from enforcing the mortgage against him by the statute of limitations.” The court found that a review of the trial court record did “not suggest that the parties’ consent to the agreement was involuntary, nor does the record suggest the presence of mistake, fraud, or unconscionable advantage.” Rather, they were clear as to the terms of the settlement agreement (SA) “and consented to the terms without hesitation.” Plaintiff raised the issue of the statute of limitations, and the trial court explained “that it was not addressing the substantive issues at that time but was instead asking if the parties had made offers to settle the matter. Plaintiff explained that defendant had made the offer of $10,000 to discharge the mortgage, and that plaintiff planned to make a counteroffer.” The transcript of the hearing was “clear that the parties understood the terms of the agreement and agreed to be bound by the settlement. The trial court was also clear that the parties were not obligated to negotiate a settlement and that the trial court would proceed to decide the parties’ issues if they did not want to pursue settlement.” After they “agreed to the settlement, plaintiff sought judicial determination of his arguments that he was entitled to default judgment and that enforcement of the mortgage is barred by the statute of limitation.” However, the trial court “did not reach those issues because the parties had already agreed to settle the matter. Plaintiff clearly agreed on the record to settle the litigation, thereby waiving his right to assert those theories, and was not entitled to have the consent judgment set aside.” While he wanted to withdraw from the agreement, “a ‘change of heart’” was insufficient to justify setting aside a SA.