Whistleblower action under the False Claims Act (31 USC §§ 3729–3733); §§ 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), & (G); Whether the relator’s claim was barred by a “prior public disclosure”; U.S. ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp.; U.S. ex rel. Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found.; Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, § 10104(j)(2); U.S. ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A.; U.S. ex rel. Gear v. Emergency Med. Assocs. of IL, Inc. (7th Cir.); U.S. ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co.; U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp.; U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc.; Whether other complaints are “public” under the amended public-disclosure bar; The qui tam relator as the government’s agent under § 3730(e)(4)(A); U.S. ex rel. Forney v. Medtronic, Inc. (ED PA); U.S. ex rel. Gilbert v. Virginia Coll., LLC (ND AL); The pre-amendment disclosure bar; U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc.; United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus. (10th Cir.); U.S. ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort Corp.; U.S. ex rel. Ondis v. City of Woonsocket (1st Cir.); U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp. (10th Cir.); U.S. ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp. (2d Cir.); Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of Hartgrove, Inc. (7th Cir.); United States ex rel. Armes v. Garman (Unpub. 6th Cir.)

The court held that three prior South Carolina complaints constituted a “public disclosure” barring relator-Holloway from bringing a qui tam action against defendant-Heartland Hospice for allegedly orchestrating a corporate-wide scheme to submit false claims for payments from Medicare and Medicaid. She alleged the presentation of false claims, the use of false records or statements, and the wrongful retention of government funds. The district court ruled that her claim was not barred by a prior public-disclosure but dismissed it based on insufficient pleading. The court considered the applicability of the prior public disclosure bar. Since Holloway did not assert that she was the “original source” of the information, she had to either “show that the purported prior disclosures were not ‘public,’ or that their contents did not ‘disclose’ her allegations.” The court held that some of the public disclosures offered by Heartland involved other hospice providers and not Heartland, and the Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General report did not constitute a public disclosure. However, Heartland also cited three qui tam complaints filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina against Heartland’s parent company and related entities. The court noted that courts are split over whether a qui tam relator is the government’s agent and thus, whether a “case is not ‘public’ unless the government intervenes.” The court followed the majority of circuits by holding that “a qui tam relator is the government’s agent because the government ‘is the real party in interest,’” and it concluded that “the South Carolina cases are public under both versions of the public-disclosure bar, despite the fact that the government did not intervene.” It found that the South Carolina complaints involved the same corporate parent and the same type of fraud as this case. The current version of the statute “bars claims ‘if substantially the same allegations or transactions’ have been publicly disclosed,” but it determined that Holloway’s action would be precluded under both the pre- and post-amendment public-disclosure bar. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal.