e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 73209
Opinion Date : 06/05/2020
e-Journal Date : 06/19/2020
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Gilbert
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Letica, Stephens, and O'Brien
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Sentencing; Reasonableness of an out-of-guidelines sentence; People v. Lampe; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Beck; Larceny; MCL 750.356(2)(a); Carjacking statute; MCL 750.529a; People v. Roberts (On Remand); Judgment of sentence (JOS)

Summary

Bound by Beck, the court held that “when the trial court explicitly stated that defendant committed carjacking, contrary to the jury verdict, it relied upon acquitted conduct in violation of” his due-process rights. Thus, it vacated his JOS and remanded. He was convicted of larceny and sentenced to 5 to 10 years. He argued the trial court violated his right to due process by imposing an out-of-guidelines sentence after it determined that he carjacked the victim, even though he was acquitted of carjacking. Defendant contended that it should resentence him on the basis of his larceny conviction alone. When he was acquitted him of carjacking, the jury “determined that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) defendant used force or violence; (2) threatened the use of force or violence; or (3) put the victim in fear, during the commission of the larceny.” Stated otherwise, the consequence of acquittal “was that, while he stole property, the jury did not conclude that he ‘used force or violence, threatened the use of force or violence, or put the victim in fear in stealing his vehicle.’” His minimum recommended guidelines range was 19 to 38 months. During allocution, he “said that he was falsely arrested and denied that he committed the crime. Immediately thereafter, the trial court imposed its sentence of 5 to 10 years’ (60 to 120 months).” Notably, it did not have the benefit of Beck when it opined that he carjacked the victim. In Beck, the court “held that defendant was required to be resentenced because the sentencing court ‘punished the defendant more severely on the basis of the judge’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the murder of which the jury had acquitted him,’ in violation of ‘defendant’s due-process protections.’”

Full PDF Opinion