Right of confrontation; Crawford v. Washington; People v. Chambers; United States v. Owens; Davis v. Washington; California v. Green; Testimonial statements; Ohio v. Clark; Primary purpose of an interrogation; Bryant v. Michigan; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Admissibility under MRE 803(2) (excited utterance) & (4) (medical treatment or diagnosis); People v. Layher; People v. Smith; People v. McLaughlin; People v. Mahone; People v. Meeboer (After Remand); Harmless error; People v. Shepherd; Admissibility of former testimony under MRE 804(b)(1); People v. Meredith; People v. Farquharson; People v. Johnson; Unavailability; MRE 804(a)(5); People v. Bean; Testimony about other acts of domestic violence against a former girlfriend; MCL 768.27b(1); MRE 403; People v. Cameron; People v. Pattison; People v. Propp; People v. Watkins; The victim’s statements about other acts of domestic violence; MCL 768.27c(1) & (2); People v. Meissner; MCL 768.27c(5)(a)-(b); People v. Nunley; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 13; MCL 777.43(1)(c) & (2)(a); “Felony”; MCL 761.1(f)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s statements to her mother, the 911 dispatcher, a deputy, and an ER doctor, or in admitting the mother’s preliminary exam testimony. Further, it rejected defendant's challenges to the admission of a former girlfriend’s testimony about other acts of domestic violence under MCL 768.27b(1), and the victim’s hearsay statements about other acts of domestic violence under MCL 768.27c(1). Finally, it upheld the 25-point score for OV 13 in sentencing him. Thus, it affirmed his domestic assault (third offense) conviction and his sentence as a fourth offense habitual offender to 3 to 15 years. The court concluded that the victim’s statement to her mother constituted “an excited utterance because it was made approximately five minutes after she was assaulted and defendant drove off with” their child. While it was made in response to a question her mother asked (what happened), “the immediate nature of the exchange qualified as an excited utterance. It was made while she was under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event, there was no time to contrive or misrepresent what had happened, and the statement was relating to the startling event. Additionally, there was no violation of defendant’s confrontation rights because the statement made to her mother, not law enforcement personnel, was nontestimonial in nature. The statement was made approximately five minutes after she had been assaulted and left on the side of the road while defendant drove off with the child over whom she had sole legal and physical custody. These circumstances reflect a statement made during an ongoing emergency, not to assist in a potential prosecution.” It also found that the statements in her 911 call and to a deputy were excited utterances. Further, the circumstances indicated that her “statements to the doctor were for the primary purposes of diagnosing her medical condition and determining appropriate treatment options, not for the purpose of prosecuting a case against defendant.” As to the admission of her mother’s preliminary exam testimony, because she was unavailable, and defendant had “both the ‘opportunity’ and a ‘similar motive’ to develop” her testimony, it was admissible under MRE 804(b)(1).