Sufficiency of evidence of “sexual penetration” to support a CSC I conviction; MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MCL 750.520a(r); People v. Lockett; Cunnilingus; People v. Legg; Victim’s testimony; People v. Bailey; Conflicting evidence; People v. Smith; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. VanderVliet; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. Denson; People v. Steele; Common scheme, plan, or system; People v. Sabin (After Remand); MRE 403 balancing test; Unfair prejudice; Harmless error; People v. Solloway; People v. Elston; Judicial misconduct; People v. Stevens; People v. Willis; The trial court’s wide discretion to control the proceedings; People v. Biddles; MRE 611(a); Admission of testimony under MRE 803A; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); People v. Gursky; MRE 803A(3); Plain error review; People v. Carines

The court found that victim-S’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to support defendant’s CSC I conviction. Also, as in Sabin, because “this was a close evidentiary question, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the” other acts evidence here “was logically relevant to show a common plan, scheme, or system.” Further, it did not appear more probable than not that an error as to the admission of this evidence affected the outcome in light of the victims’ testimony and the expert witnesses. Finally, the trial court did not commit misconduct and deprive defendant of a fair trial. He was convicted of CSC offenses involving two young relatives. Defendant argued that there was not sufficient evidence of sexual penetration to support his CSC I conviction. S testified that he “touched her vagina and ‘the part you pee out of’ with his tongue.” This testimony established that he performed cunnilingus on S “by touching his mouth to her ‘urethral opening, vaginal opening, or labia.’” The court held that because “cunnilingus by definition constitutes an act of sexual penetration, [S’s] testimony sufficiently supported a finding that defendant sexually penetrated her.” To the extent that any other testimony conflicted with S’s account, the sufficiency of her “testimony was not affected because the jury could have believed [S] rather than the conflicting testimony in reaching its verdict.” Affirmed.