Waiver of right to counsel; People v. Russell; People v. Anderson; MCR 6.005(D); Jury selection; Alleged violation of Batson v. Kentucky; People v. Knight; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. Denson; People v. Martzke (On Remand); Relevant evidence; MRE 401 & 402; Effect of a defendant’s denial of all the allegations; People v. Sabin (After Remand); Effect of the length of time between the other acts & the charged acts; People v. Yost; Evidence relevant to show defendant was a sexually delinquent person under MCL 750.335a(2)(c); Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Graves; Sentencing; Imposition of two different sentences for aggravated indecent exposure & indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person; People v. Craig; Sexually delinquent person defined; MCL 750.10a; Scoring of PRV 7; MCL 777.57(1)(a) & (b); Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing; People v. Francisco
The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent, or in later revoking his right to represent himself. It rejected his claim that there was a Batson violation during voir dire, and held that the trial court did not err in admitting other acts evidence under MRE 404(b). But the trial court erred in sentencing him to two different sentences for his aggravated indecent exposure and indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person convictions, and in scoring 20 points for PRV 7. Thus, while the court affirmed his indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person and CSC IV convictions and sentences, it vacated his aggravated indecent exposure conviction and sentence, and remanded for correction of the judgment of sentence and sentencing investigation report. Defendant said several times that he wanted to represent himself. The trial court reminded him at least twice that he “was facing a potential minimum of 37 years’ imprisonment with the possibility of life.” It explained that his request “was comparable to electing to perform his own surgery. Defendant acknowledged the risk, but nonetheless expressed that he wished to move forward and represent himself. The trial court then determined that defendant could represent himself with defense counsel as standby counsel.” The court found that “the trial court satisfied all the requirements” of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D). As to revocation of the right, the record showed that his “attempt at self-representation was disruptive to the judicial process.” As to his Batson argument, defendant did not show that the trial court excused the juror in question due to racial discrimination. The court also held that the other acts evidence, which “was highly relevant to show that the alleged instances of indecent exposure occurred and that defendant was a sexually delinquent person under MCL 750.335a(2)(c)[,]” was properly admitted. However, the parties agreed that the jury’s finding that he “was a sexually delinquent person should not have been treated as a separate crime carrying a separate sentence for the purposes of MCL 750.335a.” While the court also found that PRV should have only been scored at 10 points, he was not entitled to resentencing because the change did not alter his guidelines range.
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