Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Rood; Accommodation of known cognitive disabilities; In re Terry; In re Hicks/Brown; A respondent’s responsibility to participate in & benefit from services; In re TK; Due process; Entry of an interim dispositional order in one parent’s absence; In re Juvenile Commitment Costs; Plain error review; In re Utrera; Waiver; Holmes v. Holmes; Harboring error as an appellate parachute; In re Hudson; Children’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Jones; In re Moss Minors; In re White

While the court held that the trial court erred in terminating respondent-mother’s (Lee) parental rights under § (a)(ii), the error was harmless because termination was supported by §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). It rejected both respondents’ claims that the DHHS did not reasonably accommodate their cognitive disabilities, and found that respondent-father (Williams) waived his claim of error as to entry of the interim disposition order in his absence. Finally, the court found that terminating Lee’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the order terminating respondents’ parental rights. As to reasonable reunification efforts, the record showed that they “were offered a multitude of services to remove the barriers to reunification. Moreover, and more importantly,” the DHHS modified its practices to give them “the best opportunity to benefit from the services offered.” It did not fail to accommodate their disabilities. Rather, “respondents failed to take advantage of the services offered.” As to statutory grounds, the court agreed with Lee that the trial court erred in finding that § (a)(ii) was established. But because the trial court did not err in determining that §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j) existed, the error was harmless. The evidence revealed “that at the time of termination, Lee had yet to address, in a meaningful way, any of the conditions that caused her children to come into care.” Further, she failed to “successfully participate in or complete any of the services. A parent’s failure to comply with a court-ordered treatment plan is indicative of neglect and evidence that return of the child to the parent may cause a substantial risk of harm to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.” There was also evidence that she would not be able “to remove the barriers to reunification anytime soon. The children had been in care for approximately two years. Lee was in no better position to” show that she could parent them than at the time of their removal. As to their best interests, the evidence overwhelmingly established that she could not safely parent the children. It was questionable whether there was a parent-child bond, they had special needs she “did not fully appreciate or understand,” and by contrast, they “were thriving in their foster care placement and the foster parents had expressed a willingness to adopt” them.