Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Due process; In re Rood; In re Ferranti; Plain error review; In re Beers; No-contest pleas; MCR 3.971(B); In re Pederson; MCR 3.971(B)(1) & (4); Principle that the court is a court of record; MCR 7.210(A); People v. Young; People v. Martzke; Johnston v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; Purpose of a no contest plea; Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co.; Matter of Andino; Bright-line rules; Hartford v. Holmes; Ross v. Highway Comm’rs of Taylor Twp.; Pellegrino v. AMPCO Sys. Parking

The court concluded that because nothing in the record showed that respondents-parents “were actually aware of the allegations in the petition or that their pleas could be used against them at a later termination proceeding,” it was constrained to hold “that MCR 3.971(B)(1) and (4) were violated and that respondents were deprived of their due process rights as a” result. Thus, the trial court did not have the dispositional authority to terminate their parental rights. The court noted that it did not believe Ferranti precluded the trial court and the DHHS “from taking into consideration on remand any and all up-to-date information” as to the children and respondents. It held that two significant and obvious failures occurred here. First, it found “it difficult to imagine either respondent was not actually aware of the allegations in the petition, whether by reading it or by consulting with their attorneys.” However, there was no actual record evidence to this effect. “Thus, MCR 3.971(B)(1) was plainly and clearly violated.” The court thought “that due process might have been satisfied if it had been unambiguously established on the record that respondents were fully aware of the contents of the petitions.” But their actual awareness of the contents could not be reasonably inferred from the record evidence. Thus, the court was constrained by Ferranti to hold that their “pleas were not knowing and therefore not voluntary on this basis. Secondly, neither respondent was advised that their plea could later be used as evidence in a proceeding to terminate their parental rights. Thus, MCR 3.971(B)(4) was also plainly and clearly violated.” The court found “it difficult to believe that this error was harmful, because respondents each entered pleas of no contest.” In contrast to pleas of admission, it did “not understand what practical evidence could later be presented based solely on respondents’ decisions to forego a procedural safeguard.” However, the fact remained that there was “nothing in the record to show that either respondent understood that their plea could be used as evidence against them in a later proceeding.” Thus, Ferranti required it to hold that their “pleas were also not knowing and therefore not voluntary on this basis.” The court found this determination perplexing because neither of them argued “that they would have declined to enter their pleas, if only the trial court had read the petitions to them on the record or advised them that their pleas might be used against them.” Vacated and remanded.