Retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; 42 USC § 2000e–3(a); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; Laster v. City of Kalamazoo; Whether plaintiff’s complaints of discriminatory hiring practices were the “but-for cause” of her termination; Dixon v. Gonzales; Temporal proximity; Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist.; Tuttle v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville; Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.; Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co.; MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Heightened scrutiny theory; Hamilton v. General Elec. Co.; Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Cantrell v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); “Intervening cause”; Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cnty.; Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs.; Whether an alleged complaint about “differential treatment of employees” amounted to protected activity; Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.; Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc.; Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.; Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t; Kyle-Eiland v. Neff (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Claims under the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Mumm v. Charter Twp. of Superior (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Garg v. Macomb Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs. (MI); Hazle v. Ford Motor Co. (MI); Rodrigues v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (Unpub. 6th Cir.)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-employer (Aspen Technologies) on plaintiff-former employee’s (Kenney) Title VII and ELCRA retaliation claims because Kenney failed to make her prima facie case by not establishing that her complaints about Aspen’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices was the “but for” cause of her termination. She accused Aspen of firing her in retaliation for her complaints about its alleged discriminatory hiring practices. Aspen argued that her harsh management style was responsible for many of its hourly employees quitting. The court found that the issue was causation; whether Kenney’s complaints of discriminatory hiring practices were “the but-for cause” of her termination. She was fired approximately two and a half months after her alleged complaint. But the court noted that, other than the temporal element, she failed to offer any other evidence of causation. She did not rebut the fact that two formal complaints had been “filed against her for harassing employees[,]” and that Aspen was short-staffed during a critical project and was having difficulty attracting employees. She also did not point “to evidence that any of the dozens of employees who quit did so for reasons other than her harsh management style.” Further, she failed to establish that her “job performance was unduly scrutinized.” The court also held that there were two “intervening causes" between the protected activity and an adverse employment action that dispelled any inference of causation—“the complaints filed against Kenney and the documented instances of Aspen employees leaving due to her management style.” It noted that either cause would have overcome her claim. As for her assertion that she spoke to Aspen’s Vice President about differential treatment of employees, the court held that she failed to establish that this was a “protected activity” under federal law where there was no evidence that their conversation “amounted to more than a ‘vague charge of discrimination.’” Finally, she was unable to establish pretext. As for her claims under Michigan law, the court noted that Michigan uses the federal Title VII framework in assessing retaliation claims and that the result would be the same.