Divorce; Enforceability of a postnuptial agreement; Hodge v. Parks; Randall v. Randall; Lentz v. Lentz; Rockwell v. Rockwell’s Estate; Ransford v. Yens; Day v. Chamberlain; Duress; Allard v. Allard; Whether there was a material breach when a party failed to follow a “cooling off” provision; Michaels v. Amway Corp.; Holtzlander v. Brownell; Asset disclosure; In re Benker’s Estate; In re Oversmith’s Estate; Property division; Woodington v. Shokoohi; Invasion of separate assets; MCL 552.23(1) & 552.401; Allard v. Allard (On Remand); Attorney fees; Reed v. Reed; MCR 3.206(D)(1) & (2)(a); Loutts v. Loutts

Rejecting the proposition that all postnuptial agreements addressing property rights in the event of a divorce that are made by happily married couples are invalid as a matter of law, the court held that the one here was not against public policy. It also rejected defendant-ex-husband’s claim that he signed the agreement under duress, and concluded that plaintiff-ex-wife did not materially breach it by failing to follow a cooling off provision before filing for divorce. As to his asset disclosure claim, the undisputed evidence showed that he was aware of the coins in question. Further, given that the trial court determined the property distribution in the agreement “was fair and equitable, it properly ruled that Allard” did not apply. Finally, the court rejected his claim he was entitled to attorney fees. It found that Ransford was “the most applicable case to resolving the validity of the parties’ agreement. And, it is an example of a postnuptial agreement upheld by the Supreme Court when it was entered into by a married couple living together while setting forth their respective rights and obligations as to existing property and future obligations should a divorce or separation occur.” The court noted that the plain language of the parties’ agreement stated “their mutual desire ‘to define and clarify their respective rights in each other’s property and in any jointly owned property . . . .’” Nothing in the agreement indicated “it was created in contemplation of a future separation or divorce. In fact, [it] contained terms to help support the marriage.” The court also rejected defendant’s assertion that the agreement’s property “division made it more attractive for plaintiff to divorce him. In fact, as the trial court recognized, the evidence is the opposite.” The court found it important that they “discussed and negotiated the agreement for 16 months, most of which was” before they were married. It was supposed to be a prenuptial agreement, and only became a postnuptial one due to time constraints. The court agreed with the trial court that, because this agreement “addressed the disposition of property at death or in case of divorce, and otherwise allowed the parties to pursue their marriage in a manner most likely to allow it to flourish, and was not otherwise inequitable in its terms, it was not contrary to public policy.” It affirmed the divorce judgment and order ruling that the agreement was enforceable.