Setting aside a default & default judgment; Brooks Williamson & Assoc., Inc. v. Mayflower Constr. Co.; MCR 2.603(A)(2); MCR 2.603(B)(1)(a)(i); Good cause; MCR 2.603(D)(1); Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. Waterbury Headers Corp.; Writ of garnishment; MCR 3.101(E)(1) & (H)(1); MCR 3.101(M)(1) & (2); MCR 3.101(G)(1); Notice of an accident & lawsuit; Tenneco, Inc. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co.; Abandoned issue; Good v. Armstrong

In Docket No. 342478, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying garnishee defendant-Grange Insurance Company’s motion to set aside the default judgment, concluding it held no property subject to garnishment. In Docket No. 347426, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-Grange, holding “as a matter of law that Grange was prejudiced by the untimely notice by losing the ability to evaluate, negotiate, defend, and settle the suit and to otherwise contest” plaintiff-A-1 Towing’s liability. The cases arose out of a motorcycle-automobile accident involving plaintiff-Foucher. In Docket No. 342478, the court determined that Grange “appeared” in the case by filing garnishee disclosures, “which served as ‘answers’ to Foucher’s ‘complaints.’” Despite its “appearance, Foucher did not give Grange notice of the default that was entered.” The court noted that even if Grange had not appeared in the case, “it was entitled to notice as the defaulted party.” And he clearly “knew where to serve Grange with the notice, considering that Foucher had previously served Grange with writs of garnishment and had received garnishee disclosures from” it. Also, he did not give any notice to Grange of his “request for entry of a default judgment, let alone seven days’ notice.” Although Foucher contended “that Grange failed to appear because Grange did not file the garnishee disclosure in connection with A-1 Towing, the garnishment proceeding was itself the relevant ‘civil action[],’ with Foucher as the garnishment plaintiff and Grange as the garnishee defendant.” Thus, Grange had appeared in the action. The court concluded that, in “examining Foucher’s multiple, inexcusable failures to comply with the notice requirements in MCR 2.603, it is difficult not to conclude that gamesmanship was afoot.” Thus, it found that “Grange was entitled to have the default judgment set aside . . . .” It also concluded “that manifest injustice would occur if the default judgment were not set aside.” Further, it held that Grange “established good cause to set aside both the default and default judgment because Grange did in fact file a garnishee disclosure in response to Foucher’s” 6/22/17 writ of garnishment, although “with a misnomer in the caption. The clerical error in the caption did not establish grounds for entering a default or a default judgment.”