MCR 2.401(F) (compelling a party’s agent or representative to appear at a settlement conference); Kornak v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Effect of failing to appear; MCR 2.401(G)(1); Principle that the court cannot force a settlement on the parties; Henry v. Prusak

Concluding that plaintiff’s managing director had adequate knowledge and settlement authority to qualify as an appropriate substitute for its CEO at the settlement conference, the court held that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff violated MCR 2.401(F) and in ordering it to pay sanctions to defendants’ attorneys. The trial court ordered the CEO to appear at the “conference. Plaintiff instead brought its managing director” who the trial court concluded was not a proper substitute, and thus that plaintiff failed to comply. While a “trial court may order that a specified individual be available for a settlement conference, a party complies with the order if it appears with a substitute who has ‘information and authority adequate for responsible and effective participation in the conference for all purposes, including settlement,’ as required by MCR 2.401(F)(2).” The trial court relied on Kornak in concluding, “in part, that because the managing director did not have unlimited authority to settle the case, plaintiff had not complied with” MCR 2.401(F)(2). But the court’s conclusion in Kornak that the former version of “MCR 2.401(F) was satisfied when a party was represented at a settlement conference by someone with ‘unlimited authority and unfettered discretion to settle’” did not equally apply “to the more flexible amended language of MCR 2.401(F).” The record indicated that “the managing director had, if not limitless authority, at least ample authority to settle the case.” He asserted in an affidavit “that during the settlement conference he had made offers of settlement that included reducing plaintiff’s demand from $2,740,300 to $2,000,000, and that he had authority to settle for an even lower amount.” Further, there was no indication that a settlement “was hampered by any limitation of the managing director’s authority to settle the case.” The fact a settlement was not reached was not determinative. While the court understood “the trial court’s consternation over the fact that plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel defied” its direction, and plaintiff’s counsel chose to appear with the managing director without advising it in advance, the revised language appears “to allow this choice under these facts and does not support the trial court’s award of sanctions.” Vacated and remanded.