42 USC § 1983; U.S. Const. amend IV; Excessive force based on unreasonably tight handcuffing; Baynes v. Cleland; Morrison v. Board of Trs. of Green Twp.; Marvin v. City of Taylor; Kostrzewa v. City of Troy; Courtright v. City of Battle Creek; Jurisdiction to review plaintiff’s allegations of carpal tunnel syndrome; Mitchell v. Forsyth; Bunkley v. City of Detroit; Johnson v. Jones; Adams v. Blount Cnty.; Qualified immunity; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd; Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan; Kisela v. Hughes; False arrest claim; Devenpeck v. Alford; Gardenhire v. Schubert; City of Escondido v. Emmons; District of Columbia v. Wesby; Criss v. City of Kent; Ahlers v. Schebil; Logsdon v. Hains; Feathers v. Aey; Hope v. Pelzer; Leonard v. Robinson; Spoliation of evidence; Beaven v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice; Adkins v. Wolever; Municipal liability for failure to train; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.; Brown v. Shaner; Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist.; Board of Comm’rs v. Brown; Cherrington v. Skeeter; City of Canton v. Harris; Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty.

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the right to be free from arrest based solely on one witness’s “unreliable and uncorroborated accusation” was clearly established at the time of plaintiff-Ouza’s arrest, and that the arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim. It also held that both defendants-officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on her excessive force claim based on tight handcuffing, and that the defendant-city was not entitled to summary judgment on her failure to train claim. These cases arose out of domestic-violence visits police made to Ouza’s home. She was arrested based on her ex-husband’s (M) allegation that she was the aggressor. She asserted an excessive force claim based on unreasonably tight handcuffing. She offered photos of the red marks on her wrists, which indicated they still remained the day after the incident, and also claimed she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome since the incident. On appeal, the court first found that it had jurisdiction to review whether the district court properly adopted Ouza’s version of the facts when assessing qualified immunity. It held that she established a genuine factual dispute as to “‘some physical injury’ resulting from the handcuffing[,]” and affirmed the district court’s ruling that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court next held that defendant-Dottor was not entitled to qualified immunity on Ouza’s false arrest claim where he was aware that M was not being truthful, he ignored the claims of Ouza and her daughter that M was the aggressor, and even M objected to her arrest and admitted he was the aggressor. It held that a witness’s “allegation standing alone does not give an officer probable cause to arrest the suspect[,]” and case law has established that Ouza “had a right to be free from arrest based solely on [M’s] unreliable and uncorroborated accusation.” As to her spoliation of evidence claim, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that declined to adopt an adverse inference. As to Ouza’s failure to train claim, the city offered no evidence to counter her allegations. Because “[t]he failure to provide any training on probable cause determinations or use of force (including handcuffing technique) is constitutionally inadequate[.]” Ouza established a factual dispute whether the city acted with “deliberate indifference to its citizens’ constitutional rights.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.